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Abstract: 
is essay provides an interpretation and defence of Gilbert Ryle's discussion of knowing how,  
which has hitherto received relatively little attention given the importance of his remarks to  
the contemporary literature. I argue that Ryle oﬀers an account of knowing how which can be 
contrasted with both so-called 'intellectualist' and 'neo-Rylean' theories. is consists of two 
claims concerning the conditions for the psychological state of having an ability, which on  
Ryle's implicit deﬁnition can be termed 'knowing how'. Abilities of this kind consist in reliable  
success, where this success can be attributed to the agent who possesses the ability. e 
negative claim is that knowing how to do a kind of activity does not require being in any  
mental state with propositional content. e positive claim is that it is necessary and suﬃcient 
for knowing how to do an activity of some kind that one is disposed to act in accordance with  
learned rules when carrying out that activity.
I then defend this account against objections drawn from linguistic and psychological  
considerations. e aim is to treat these two areas of objection in general by looking at two  
speciﬁc objections and showing why they do not work. Although critical accounts of Ryle's  
theor y in the recent literature have mainly focused on the erroneous neo -Rylean  
interpretation, I apply the two objections to the Rylean theory properly understood. e two 
objections are Stanley and Williamson's much-discussed linguistic argument for the claim that  
knowing how is a kind of knowing that, and Bengson and Moﬀett's argument from conceptual 
understanding. I argue that these objections suﬀer from lack of support, and give an account of  
the structure of the constitutive conditions of knowing how to demonstrate why this is the  
case that arises from considering some remarks of Michael Dummett's.
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0. Introduction
Knowing how is a topic of philosophical interest for at least two diﬀerent reasons, beyond 
simply being an interesting phenomenon in itself. One is that some activities that creatures  
such as ourselves know how to do are of philosophical interest. For instance, we know how to  
speak and understand a language. A theory of language is partly a theory of what goes into  
knowing how to speak and understand. is introduces the need to ﬁnd out what goes into 
knowing how to do anything, since diﬀerent views on that general question may imply  
diﬀerent views on the speciﬁc question, and diﬀerent views on the speciﬁc question may imply 
radically diﬀerent views about the nature of the activity in question. e other reason is that 
knowing how seems to be a distinctive kind of mental state. Questions about the nature of the  
mind may turn on diﬀerent views about whether and in what way this is correct. So an  
understanding of knowing how is important both for understanding the things we know how  
to do, and for understanding ourselves as creatures that know how to do them. 
Gilbert Ryle can be credited with introducing the topic of knowing how as an area of  
philosophical debate. His primary interest in doing so was aligned more with the second  
reason, but it is undoubtedly the case that his contribution has had rami ﬁcations for debates 
aligned with the ﬁrst. And indeed, Ryle's discussion is not merely important for having  
introduced the topic. His contribution has largely set the terms of the on-going debate as to  
how best to understand knowing how. It is hard (in my experience, impossible) to ﬁnd a 
philosophical text on the subject that does not at least mention Ryle in passing, either as an  
endorsement of (what is taken to be) his view, or, as has become increasingly common, in a  
more critical mood. However, in the face of all this, it is also surprising how little close  
attention is given to what he actually claimed. e goal of this essay is therefore to provide a  
careful reading of Ryle's discussion of knowing how, and provide an account of the theory to  
be found therein. It will be the contention of this essay that both supporters and detractors of  
Ryle on knowing how have been mistaken in several respects. 
By supporters, I mean proponents of what I will term the 'neo-Rylean' theory (see section 1.6  
below). Although not a precisely deﬁned position, as will be seen, it can be identiﬁed as what 
those who take a sympathetic view of the Rylean theory oen advocate. Although it bears  
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some similarities to the Rylean theory, a proper interpretation shows that it is overstated in  
some respects, and is less than ideally clear in others, in a way that is unnecessary given the  
resources Ryle provides. By detractors, I mean proponents of what are usually termed  
intellectualist theories. ese are theories that hold some version of the claim that knowing  
how constitutively requires an individual to be in a mental state or collection of mental states  
with propositional content (typically, knowing that p, or believing that p). Ryle's theory is not 
intellectualist in this sense. Intellectualism is sometimes motivated by a rejection of the Rylean  
theory. Such a motivation needs to be correct on the details of that theory in order to be  
compelling. And equally, those sympathetic to Ryle would obviously do better with an  
accurate rendition of his theory. Participants in the debate about knowing how can largely be  
placed into these two camps, and so getting a correct interpretation is important for the debate  
as a whole.
Getting an accurate interpretation of Ryle is not merely of scholarly interest. e other goal of 
this essay is to show that the Rylean theory of knowing how is well motivated, and that it can  
be defended against many of the objections brought against it. e argument need not, and 
does not, pretend to the status of a proof. I am not certain that a proof of the correctness of the  
theory can be given. As will be seen, there are many points in the argument where one can only  
take stock of the possible moves and make a judgement as to which is the most reasonable to  
make, rather than make a decision on deductive grounds. For this reason, motivating the  
theory and defending it against its intellectualist critics will be as far as the argument for it can  
go here. e conclusion will be that both of the dominant parties in the debate about knowing 
how are mistaken.
e focus of the argument will be on intellectualist objections to the Rylean theory. e main 
issue will be whether it is a constitutive condition on knowing how to do something that one is  
in a propositional mental state. I said earlier that an understanding of knowing how to do an  
activity is important for our understanding of activities like speaking a language, and more  
broadly, the nature of mind. e debate about the role of propositional mental states with  
respect to knowing how provides (if not the only, then certainly) one of the ways in which this  
is so. Propositional mental states are a species of what we might call representational states, 
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since holding some attitude to a proposition is a way of representing the world as being the way  
that proposition describes. If knowing how to do something constitutively requires being in a  
representational state, then this provides support for a representational theory of mind, on  
which the nature of mental phenomena are to explained in terms of representational states. On  
the other hand, if knowing how does not constitutively require being in a representational  
state, then this gives support to a non-representational theory of mind. Similar points go for  
the epistemology of language. e debate between the Rylean and the intellectualist about  
knowing how is therefore an important part of this more general philosophical controversy.
e essay falls roughly into two halves. e aim of the ﬁrst half of the essay is to provide the  
interpretation of the content and structure of the central claims of that theory, as put forward  
in his e Concept of Mind (1949; henceforth CM) and his earlier presidential address to the  
Aristotelian Society (1945; henceforth PA) e occasion for Ryle's discussion of knowing how 
in both cases is an argument against an intellectualist theory of intelligent behaviour. In  
section 1.1, I give an interpretation of Ryle's statement of this theory, which emphasises its  
connection to the Cartesian view of the mind, which CM as a whole is dedicated to opposing.  
Section 1.2 gives an account of Ryle's arguments against the theory. In section 1.3, I discuss  
two puzzling aspects of Ryle's transition from this refutation to making a claim which is key to  
his theory of knowing how, and in section 1.4, I provide an interpretation of this claim as a  
way of solving the puzzle. Section 1.5 completes the interpretation by providing an account of  
the second key claim, which makes up the positive part of the Rylean theory of knowing how.  
Section 1.6 concludes by distinguishing the Rylean theory proper from the neo-Rylean theory.
e aim of the second half is to defend the theory as interpreted in the ﬁrst against objections 
informed by intellectualism about knowing how. Such objections are those that explicitly deny  
the negative part of the Rylean theory, and so undermine the positive part. Section 2.1 outlines  
two broad areas from which intellectualist objections might be drawn: linguistics and  
psychology. Section 2.2 sets out Stanley and Williamson's (2001) linguistic argument for what 
they term intellectualism, which they take to contradict Ryle . Against this argument, in section 
2.3 I endorse a line of argument taken from Cath (forthcoming), which shows that the most  
plausible version of intellectualism must be such as to be compatible with the negative view.  
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Section 2.4 examines Bengson and Moﬀett's (2007) argument that knowing how requires the 
subject to have some sort of conceptual understanding, which in turn requires propositional  
mental states. In section 2.5, I give reasons for thinking that the move to second requirement  
in what I call the understanding objection is unsound. In section 2.6, I consider some remarks  
made by Michael Dummett (1993) about the representation of abilities in terms of knowledge 
which raise the possibility that there are two senses of knowing how, where one of these senses  
requires an intellectualist analysis. By giving an account of the reasons why Bengson and  
Moﬀett's objection fail, I argue that this representation problem is not genuine. I conclude by 
giving a summary of the argument in the essay, and make suggestions for further research.
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1. Interpretation
e ﬁrst part of this essay approaches Ryle's theory of knowing how by placing it within the  
broader context of his concerns in the philosophy of mind. e content of the theory is 
sometimes presented as though it were quite straightforward, but it shall be seen that this is far  
from being the case. ere are number of puzzles involved in Ryle's presentation of his two key  
claims, of which the following is intended as a clariﬁcation. Doing so will illuminate some 
features of the theory that are not present in more standard interpretations.
1.1 e Intellectualist Legend 
Ryle's has two discussions of knowing how, in CM and PA, both of which take place within the 
context of an argument against what is variously referred to as 'the prevailing doctrine ( PA: 1), 
'the intellectualist doctrine' (CM: 27), and more consistently 'the intellectualist legend.' ( CM: 
31) To understand what Ryle has to say about knowing how, it is therefore useful to consider  
these arguments. Giving a deﬁnite shape to the content of the intellectualist legend is not  
straightforward. In PA, Ryle summarises the position as holding
(1) that Intelligence is a special faculty, the exercises of which are those speci ﬁc 
internal acts which are called acts of thinking , namely, the operations of  
considering propositions ; (2) that practical activities merit their titles  
"intelligent," " clever," and the rest only because they are accompanied by some  
such internal acts of considering propositions (and particularly " regulative "  
propositions). at is to say, doing things is never itself an exercise of intelligence,  
but is, at best, a process introduced and somehow steered by some ulterior act of  
theorising. (PA: 1)
In CM, Ryle is less concise, and there are a number of occasions where Ryle sets out ideas  
which he attributes to the legend he wants to oppose:
[B]oth laymen and philosophers tend to to treat intellectual operations as the  
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core of mental conduct... they tend to deﬁne all other mental-conduct concepts  
in terms of concepts of cognition. (ibid.)
[T]he intellectualist doctrine... tries to deﬁne intelligence in terms of the 
apprehension of truths. (ibid.)
It follows [from the intellectualist legend's assumptions] that the operation  
which is characterised as intelligent must be preceded by an intellectual  
acknowledgement of these rules or criteria; that is, the agent must go through the  
internal process of avowing to himself certain propositions about what is to be  
done...; only then can he execute his performance in accordance with those  
dictates. (CM: 30)
I shall argue that the intellectualist legend is false and that when we describe a  
performance as intelligent, this does not entail the double operation of  
considering and executing. (ibid.)
e absurd assumption made by the intellectualist legend is this, that a  
performance of any sort inherits all its title to intelligence from some anterior  
internal operation of planning what to do. (CM: 32)
We can summarise the intellectualist legend that Ryle wishes to oppose as consisting of two  
propositions:
(IL1) All mental operations can be put into two categories: there are mental activities  
which consist in considering a proposition, and there are mental activities which are  
controlled by anterior mental operations of the ﬁrst sort.
(IL2) Operations which count as intelligent fall into the second category, and that it is  
in virtue of this that they count as intelligent activities, or have the features that qualify  
them as intelligent. 
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To expand a little on IL1, the idea is that the ﬁrst sort of mental operation, which adopting 
Ryle's terminology we can call intellectual operations, are those involved in “that special class of  
operations which constitute theorising.” (CM: 27) eorising, we may presume, is the activity 
undertaken by the intellect, or if we are unhappy with talking in the terms of faculty  
psychology, the mind in its intellectual capacity. IL2 states that whether or not an operation  
counts as intelligent depends on whether they are controlled by an intellectual operation. is 
goes even for activities which are not mental in the sense that they are not merely carried out,  
as we might say, in the mind (Ryle carries out an extended discussion of this metaphor, cf. CM: 
36-40), but also involve bodily actions. Such activities are mental in the sense that and insofar  
as they involve, as we might say, presence of mind. Less metaphorically, the idea is that bodily  
actions can count as mental operations to the extent that there is some contribution to the  
nature of the action from the mind of the person whose action it is. Operations of this kind are  
what we can call intelligent behaviour, and the intellectualist legend can be thought of as a  
theory of intelligent behaviour that appeals to intellectual operations.
e intellectualist legend so described is likely to seem unclear. ere are two particularly 
pressing questions of clariﬁcation which apply to IL1. One is a question regarding the 
importance of the claim about the priority of the intellectual operations in question. Must the  
operations be prior, or might they also run in parallel? And what sort of priority is at issue?  
e point that the intellectual operations are prior is the component of the intellectualist  
legend which will be important for Ryle's arguments against it, but there could be a question  
about whether one could derive the general thrust without it. A second question is about what  
it means to contemplate a proposition. Ryle is less than explicit about what such an act of  
contemplation might entail. e more natural idea would be that one contemplates the action,  
and one does so in a way that involves propositions; 'contemplating a proposition' resists  
simple paraphrase, and although Ryle is obviously unsympathetic to the position he is  
describing, a more plausible account of it would not damage his argument. A third issue is that  
there are grounds for doubt about whether or not Ryle is attacking a genuine theory, or merely  
a strawman for the sake of making a point. To make a judgement on this, we need to consider  
the sources of the theory that Ryle mentions.
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Ryle's earlier discussion of the intellectualist legend identiﬁes its origin in Plato (PA: 1). In 
CM, w e  ﬁnd a somewhat vaguer allusion, when we are told that “[t]he Greek idea that  
immortality is reserved for the theorising part of the soul was discredited, but not dispelled, by  
Christianity.” (CM: 27) Later on, however, Ryle devotes a section to 'e Motives of the 
Intellectualist Legend', in which he asks how it can be, “in the face of their own daily  
experience,” (CM: 32) that people are drawn so strongly to the theory of intelligent behaviour  
encapsulated above as IL1-2. “Part of the answer,” Ryle says, is that “they are wedded to the  
dogma of the ghost in the machine.” (ibid.) In the ﬁrst chapter of CM, Ryle states his overall 
ambition:
I shall oen speak of it ['the oﬃcial doctrine'], with deliberate abusiveness, as 'the 
dogma of the Ghost in the Machine'. I hope to prove it entirely false, and false not  
in detail but in principle... It is one big category mistake. (CM: 17)
e 'oﬃcial doctrine', which is a “doctrine about the nature and place of minds” ( CM: 1), is 
said to come “chieﬂy from Descartes.” (ibid.) We can conclude from this that the intellectualist  
legend and the Cartesian conception of the mind are meant to be somehow related  
(interestingly, PA makes no mention of this). Elaborating a little on what this link is, Ryle  
claims that assuming “the antithesis between 'physical' and 'mental'” ( CM: 32) as does the 
Cartesian conception means that bodily action “cannot itself be a mental operation.” (ibid.)  
One must therefore postulate a link between purely mental operations and purely bodily  
actions for the latter to count as intelligent. Ryle does not expand much on the link between  
the more general Cartesian conception of the mind and the more speciﬁc intellectualist theory 
of intelligent behaviour, and having identiﬁed the one as a motivation for the other, he  
immediately goes on to show how the division between the mental and the physical does not  
do the work that this way of motivating the intellectualist legend requires ( CM: 33-35). It 
bears mentioning that Ryle not only thinks that the Cartesian conception of mind is a source  
of the intellectualist legend, but that the latter is a source of motivation for the former (cf.  
CM: 27, 35, 49-50), although the explanation of how this is so may fail to convince.
I propose, however, to take the seriously the possibility that the Cartesian conception of the  
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mind is one of the ways at least to motivate the intellectualist legend, and to use this to answer  
the questions of clariﬁcation raised about IL1. e Cartesian conception of the mind is a  
familiar one, but has the disadvantage of many familiar ideas in that it is hard to say exactly  
what it is. Nor do we want, given present concerns, to get too deeply involved in Descartes  
exegesis. Fortunately, we do not need to say everything necessary for a complete description of  
the Cartesian conception. ere are three salient claims: 
(CC1) oughts are modiﬁcations of mental substance.
(CC2) Modiﬁcations of mental substance are conscious episodes.
(CC3) oughts can enter into causal relations with material bodies.
CC1 is obviously one of the central tenets of Descartes' conception of the mind. e idea is 
that there is a fundamental distinction with respect to the that can exist although nothing else  
does - that is, what is a substance - between the mental and the material, where the primary  
attribute of mental substance is thought, and the primary attribute of the material is extension.  
And, as distinct from idealism, CC1 also brings a commitment to the existence of material as  
well as mental substance. With respect to CC2, one ﬁnds the following deﬁnition in the 
Principles:
By the term ‘thought’, I understand everything which we are aware of as  
happening within us, in so far as we have awareness of it. ( Descartes, 1984/5, vol. 
I: 195)
CC3 is supported by the following quote from Descartes' latter to Gassendi:
ese questions [about mental causation] presuppose amongst other things an  
explanation of the union between the soul and the body, which I have not yet  
dealt with at all. But I will say, for your beneﬁt at least, that the whole problem 
contained in such questions arises simply from  a supposition that is false and  
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cannot in any way be proved, namely that, if the soul and the body are two  
substances whose nature is diﬀerent, this prevents them from being able to act on 
each other (Descartes, 1984/5, vol. II: 275; emphasis added). 
is partial characterisation of the Cartesian conception of the mind can help us with  
understanding the intellectualist legend in the following way. A theory of intelligent behaviour  
can be understood as a part of a theory of action in general. One issue in the theory of action is  
to say what diﬀerentiates things like bodily reﬂexes from bodily movements that count as  
actions proper. We can assume that the aim of this theory will be to say what the contribution  
of mental states is to this distinction. A theory of intelligent behaviour needs to give an  
account of a more speciﬁc kind of action, namely one that displays certain positive qualities,  
which can be put under the heading of intelligence. If one has the conception of mind  
according to which mental states are thoughts understood as modi ﬁcations of mental 
substance, conscious episodes of thinking, then what kind of theory of intelligent behaviour  
would one hold? Perhaps there are a great many things one could say here, but a very general  
answer is to say that intelligent behaviour is action controlled by thoughts about how to do the  
action in questions, which is equivalent to IL2.
Viewing the intellectualist legend as a consequence of CC1-3 can help with answering the two  
questions of clariﬁcation regarding IL1. e  ﬁrst question was: why should the mental  
operations be anterior, that is, prior to the operations they are meant to control ? CC3 says that 
minds, or rather thoughts that are modiﬁcations of mental substance, can enter into causal  
relations with bodies. Once we have granted the assumption that mental causation is possible,  
then it seems we should understand the notion of a prior mental operation controlling an 
action as a causal relation of some sort, perhaps in the sense that can be articulated with a  
counterfactual along the lines of had the thought not occurred, the action would not have  
happened at all, or would not have had the properties that it did. is does not mean that there is 
no problem of mental causation for the Cartesian conception. e point is that mental 
causation had better not be a problem for the Cartesian conception to be valid, and so when  
giving an account of the intellectualist legend in terms of the Cartesian conception, it must be  
treated as a legitimate assumption. If it is right that we should think of controlling as causing,  
15
Ryle on Knowing How
then it would follow that the thoughts need to have causal priority. e second question was: 
what does it mean to contemplate a proposition? An answer to this can be given that relies on  
the second element, CC2. oughts are conscious episodes. So contemplating a proposition 
must mean a conscious act of presenting oneself with or entertaining a regulative proposition,  
where these are just propositions that describe or prescribe a way of doing something. is 
somewhat obscure formulation can be thought in terms of avowals to oneself using a sentence 
which expresses one of the regulative propositions, though this is presumably not compulsory.
Viewing the more general theory, the Cartesian conception of the mind, as one of the possible  
motivations for the more speciﬁc theory of intelligent behaviour, the intellectualist legend,  
accounts for its features, and has the added beneﬁt of making the transition from the setting  
up of the Cartesian view of the mind as the main target in chapter one of CM to the argument 
against the intellectualist legend in chapter two look less arbitrary than it might otherwise.  
ere is no suggestion of an entailment from the more general to the more speciﬁc theory, and 
nor is there an entailment in the opposite direction. is is particularly true of CC1, since the 
real moving parts are CC2 and CC3. is is alarming since the dogma of the ghost in the  
machine is most obviously to be identiﬁed with CC1. Nor is it being proposed that seeing the  
link here decides once and for all whether or not the intellectualist legend is something of a  
strawman, only that one can tell a story linking it with Ryle's overall target in CM. One other 
proviso to keep in mind is that there may be several theories of intelligent behaviour which do  
not have the same source nor with all of the same features as, but which are very similar to, the  
intellectualist legend. is is important if only for the fact that one must not confuse Ryle's  
target with any of the nearby theories when evaluating Ryle's arguments.
1.2 Ryle's Arguments
In CM, Ryle poses two kinds of arguments against the intellectualist legend. e ﬁrst kind is 
introduced by noting the fact that there are a great many activities which it is possible to carry  
out intelligently although no one has as yet formulated the rules of doing so. As an example,  
Ryle refers to Aristotle, who formulated the rules of correct reasoning, 
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yet men knew how to avoid and detect fallacies before they learned his lessons,  
just as men since Aristotle, and including Aristotle, ordinarily conduct their  
arguments without making any internal reference to his formulae. (CM: 31) 
Ryle goes on to point out that practice precedes theory in many cases, again referring to  
Aristotle: “It was because Aristotle found himself and others reasoning now intelligently and  
now stupidly” (CM: 31) that he was able to formulate what he did. Although Ryle presents  
these claims in a single stream, there are really three diﬀerent arguments. First, there is the  
argument that intelligent practice can be done in the absence of any formulation of the  
relevant rules; second, the argument that we ordinarily do not refer to rules when engaging 
intelligently in an activity; and third, the argument that intelligent practice must in some cases  
precede the formulation of the relevant rules. None of these arguments are quite the same,  
though they all concern points about the relation between theory and practice, and we are  
directed to think the intellectualist legend has got it backwards. Consequently, we can group  
all three points together as the priority argument.
e second kind of argument is a demonstration that the intellectualist legend generates a  
regress which reduces the intellectualist legend to absurdity. Ryle states this argument  
succinctly in two sentences:
e consideration of propositions is itself an operation the execution of which  
can be more or less intelligent, less or more stupid. But if, for any operation to be  
intelligently executed, a prior theoretical operation had ﬁrst to be performed and 
performed intelligently, it would be a logical impossibility for anyone ever to  
break into the circle. (CM: 31)
is regress argument can be stated in a more extended fashion as follows:
(RA1) (Assumption for reductio) Intelligent activity is necessarily preceded by an  
anterior intellectual operation (i.e. IL2)
(RA2) e anterior intellectual operation must be carried out intelligently if the  
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intelligent activity they precede is to be intelligent.
(RA3) If anterior intellectual operations must be carried out intelligently, then they are  
themselves intelligent activities.
(RA4) (RA2, RA3, application of RA1) erefore, all anterior mental activities must 
be preceded by an anterior mental activity.
(RA5) If RA4, then the assumption generates a regress.
(RA6) If the assumption generates a regress, then IL2 is false.
(RAC) erefore, IL2 is false.
us Ryle takes the intellectualist legend to be refuted. e problem comes from the fact that  
the two categories described in IL1 are not exclusive. Since operations of the ﬁrst sort 
(considering propositions) are also operations of the second sort (intelligent activities, and  
hence controlled by operations of the ﬁrst sort), the two propositions together generate a  
regress.
In his earlier paper, Ryle mentions an argument which is somewhat like a combination of the  
priority and regress arguments (the priority argument itself is not mentioned), which I'll refer  
to as the causal regress argument:
If [IL1-2 are correct] the gap between [the] consideration and the practical  
application of the regulation has to be bridged by some go-between process...  
is go-between application-process has somehow to marry observance of a  
contemplated maxim with the enforcement of behaviour. So it has to unite in  
itself the allegedly incompatible properties of being kith to theory and kin to  
practice, else it could not be the applying of the one in the other. For, unlike  
theory, it must be able to inﬂuence action, and, unlike impulses, it must be  
amenable to regulative propositions. Consistency requires, therefore, that this  
schizophrenic broker must again be subdivided into one bit which contemplates  
but does not execute, one which executes but does not contemplate and a third  
which reconciles these irreconcilables. And so on for ever. (PA: 1-2)
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is argument is problematic insofar as at least one of the assumptions that it relies on is  
inconsistent with the position that it is supposed to be refuting. Ryle seems to be arguing that  
the intellectualist legend cannot, even on its own terms, explain the link between thought and  
action that is the mark of intelligent behaviour. In the interpretation of the intellectualist  
legend in the previous section, it was suggested that a causal relation is the most obvious way to  
understand the link. For the regress Ryle has in mind here to work, it must be the case that  
thoughts are causally closed oﬀ from the actions they are supposed to control. I take it that the  
reason the 'go-between process' must be both kin to theory (i.e. thoughts) but kin to practice  
(i.e. action) is that it must be both capable of causing action, in the way a bodily impulse is  
capable of causing action, and also have the character of a disengaged contemplation. In order  
for consistency to require the eternal subdivision of this go-between process, the disengaged  
contemplation part of the go-between process would have to be causally disengaged, in the 
sense of having no causal inﬂuence on action. Ryle understands the distinction between theory  
and practice here to have a parallel in the distinction between thought and action, and this is  
how he characterises the theory of intelligent behaviour he wants to refute. But then there is a  
contradiction between the idea that intelligent behaviour is a causal consequence of thought,  
which has been attributed to the intellectualist legend in the interpretation recommended  
here, and the idea that thought can have by itself no e ﬀect on action. So the causal regress  
argument only works if the target it is meant to attack has incoherent commitments. is 
suggests a reason why Ryle dropped the causal regress argument from CM. From now on, I 
shall use 'the regress argument' to refer only to the ﬁrst rather than the second.
1.3 A Puzzle 
We know have a fairly good grasp on the background for Ryle's claims about knowing how.  
However, there is a puzzle about exactly what the link between the refutation of the  
intellectualist legend and those claims are supposed to be. Having concluded his refutation of  
the intellectualist legend, Ryle sums up what he takes himself to have established:
'Intelligent' cannot be deﬁned in terms of 'intellectual', or 'knowing how' in terms 
of 'knowing that'; 'thinking what I am doing' does not connote 'both thinking  
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what to do and doing it'. When I do something intelligently, i.e. thinking what I 
am doing , I am doing one thing and not two. My performance has a special  
procedure or manner, not special antecedents. (CM: 32)
is short passage expresses three separate negative claims. One is about our understanding of  
intelligence epithets (about which more shortly). e idea is that they cannot be accounted for 
or in terms of the intellect, where the intellect has to do with the practice of theorising and the  
aim of knowing truths. Another is about the mental processes involved in intelligent  
behaviour, and Ryle returns to this theme throughout the chapter, in stating his aims and  
conclusions, for instance where he says he hopes “to have shown that the exercise of  
intelligence in practice cannot be analysed into a tandem operation of ﬁrst considering 
prescriptions and then executing them.” (CM: 40). A third is about knowing how, and this will 
be the focus of this section and the next.
e proposition that knowing how cannot be deﬁned in terms of knowing that is the main 
negative component of Ryle's theory of knowing how; hence I will refer to as Ryle's negative  
view about knowing how, or the negative view for short. Having made this conclusion, Ryle 
goes on to give a 'positive account' (CM: 40-50) of knowing how, the details of which will be 
examined below. But there are two questions which capture a puzzle about the negative view  
and its relation to the refutation of the intellectualist legend (which I will refer to as the  
refutation for short). Firstly, what does the refutation have to do with knowing how ? And  
secondly, what does the refutation have to do with knowing that? ese two questions are 
aspects of what we can call the transition puzzle. It is a curious feature of both PA and CM 
which is the more pressing because the positive account seemingly gets oﬀered on the basis of 
the rejection of the idea that knowing how can be deﬁned in terms of knowing that, which is  
itself seemingly supported by the refutation. e statement of the negative view implies that  
the refutation has something to do with both knowing how and knowing that. So saying  
something about both parts of the puzzle is key for understanding Ryle's position.
Is there a puzzle at all? As Stanley and Williamson (2001; henceforth KT) see things, the 
intellectualist legend is just the same as the negative view, as is made clear in the following  
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passage:
Ryle has two extended discussions of the relation between knowledge-how and  
knowledge-that [i.e. CM, ch. 2, and Ryle, 1945]. Both have as their main focus  
the rejection of what Ryle took to be the "prevailing doctrine" of the relation  
between knowledge-that and knowledge-how, which he took to follow from  
what he called "the intellectualist legend”... the thesis that knowledge-how is a  
species of knowledge-that. In addition, Ryle presents his own positive view of  
knowledge-how, according to which, contra the "intellectualist legend," it is not a  
species of knowledge-that. (op. cit.: 412)
If this is true, then there really is no puzzle at all, since the intellectualist legend and the  
negative view are just contradictories. is  reinterpretation strategy has considerable appeal, 
since it makes the statement of the negative view plainly intelligible. e mistake Ryle makes, 
on Stanley and Williamson's reading, is that the negative view is false, and they provide an  
argument to that eﬀect (op. cit.: 417-432), which will be examined in some detail below.
ere are, however, diﬃculties with this as a solution to the transition puzzle. e main 
problem is that, although it excuses Ryle of making a mistake about the connection between  
the refutation and the negative view, it creates problems with the interpretation of Ryle's  
arguments. ere are slightly diﬀerent problems related to the two kinds of argument that Ryle  
directs against the intellectualist legend. Looking at the priority argument, it makes it very  
hard to see how the three considerations adduced are supposed to have any purchase. Here it is  
useful to remind ourselves that the anterior intellectual operations involve the consideration of  
a relevant regulative proposition, but there is no requirement that the proposition must be one  
which is known. But even if it were a requirement which adherents of the intellectualist legend 
placed on the prior intellectual operations, there would still be no clear commitment either  
way on the question of whether knowing how is or is not a species of knowing that. It is  
perfectly consistent with the thought that intelligent activity be preceded by a knowledge-
involving consideration of a proposition that knowing how to do something is not a species of  
knowing that something is the case, since they could still then be distinct yet closely connected  
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mental states. As a general point, the claim that X can be deﬁned in terms of Y, although vague, 
is clearly not the same as the claim that X is identical to Y on any sharpening of the former 
claim. And nor is it obvious how inserting a requirement that someone know the regulative  
propositions that guide their action converts the intellectualist legend into the claim that  
knowing how is a species of knowing that.
Going back to the main line of objection, the initial point is that the three considerations deal  
with the relation between theory and practice, not knowing how and knowing that; the claim  
about the general priority of practice over theory on which these arguments are based is  
orthogonal to any claim about the relation between two kinds of knowledge (which is not to  
say they are wholly unrelated). So it would seem the reinterpretation strategy would require a  
further reinterpretation of these arguments, which stretches its plausibility. It is worth nothing  
that Stanley and Williamson do not mention the ﬁrst stream of argument at all, doing so  
perhaps on the basis of a quotation from PA, where Ryle says “...I rely largely on variations of 
one argument. I argue that the prevailing doctrine leads to vicious regresses...” ( PA: 2, emphasis 
added; see KT: 412) e earlier paper does not include the ﬁrst kind of argument, but this  
does not warrant ignoring them for the sake of interpreting his discussion in CM.
e problem of reinterpreting the arguments also applies to the regress argument, although to  
an extent that makes the solution not just implausible but clearly mistaken. In order to make  
the regress argument ﬁt as an argument against the contradiction of the negative view, it must  
be substantially altered. Having picked this out as Ryle's target, Stanley and Williamson go on  
to provide an interpretation of the regress argument according to which Ryle relies on the  
following two premises: the ﬁrst is the claim that 
(a) if one Fs, one employs knowledge how to F. 
e second is the claim that 
(b) if one employs knowledge that p, one considers the proposition that p (cf. KT: 
413). 
22
Ryle on Knowing How
Using 'Φ(F)' as the general form of propositions that are the objects of the prior intellectual  
operations, the assumption for reduction is then given as: 
(RA) knowledge how to F is knowledge that Φ(F).” (ibid.) 
en, letting C(Φ(F)) denote the act of considering the relevant kind of proposition, the  
regress argument is given as follows:
Suppose that Hannah Fs. By premise [a], Hannah employs the knowledge how to  
F. By RA, Hannah employs the knowledge that Φ(F). So, by premise [b], 
Hannah C(Φ(F))s. Since C(Φ(F)) is an act, we can reapply premise [a], to  
obtain the conclusion that Hannah knows how to C(Φ(F)). By RA, it then 
follows that Hannah employs the knowledge that Φ(C(Φ(F))). By premise [b], 
it follows that Hannah C(Φ(C(Φ(F))))s. And so on. (ibid.)
Taking themselves to be dealing with an argument with this form, Stanley and Williamson's  
response can be broken into three parts (KT: 414-416): ﬁrst, they claim that the two premises 
on which the argument relies are both false; second, they suggest that the premises can be  
modiﬁed in order to make them both true; premise (a) is true only of intentional actions, 
whereas premise (b) need not necessarily refer to intentional acts of contemplating  
propositions; and ﬁnally, they demonstrate that the modiﬁed premises mean that the regress  
argument they are talking about is no longer valid. Stanley and Williamson may be correct  
about how the two premises must be modiﬁed to be true. But it is hard to see how the  
resulting problem for the argument they are concerned with presents a diﬃculty for Ryle's 
regress argument, since they are plainly quite diﬀerent. One problem with their interpretation 
is that it requires attributing to Ryle two premises in an argument which are not merely false  
but quite obviously false. is compares with premises RA2 and RA3 of the regress argument  
given in the previous section: RA3 seems obviously true; RA2 can be disputed, but is not  
clearly mistaken. e second problem is that there is no evidence for attributing either claim to  
Ryle; the attribution of RA2 and RA3 is clearly supported by the text, whereas premises (a)  
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and (b) only make sense on the reinterpretation strategy. Given the lack of any evidence for  
Ryle relying on these claims to generate the regress, the fact that the re-interpretation of the  
intellectualist legend requires this misrepresentation of his regress argument is enough to rule  
it out as a way of treating the transition puzzle, and an alternative is required.
1.4 Solving the Puzzle
Rather than attempting to answer both parts of the puzzle at once, I propose instead to o ﬀer 
solutions to each separately. To begin with the ﬁrst part, why should the intellectualist legend  
have anything to do with knowing how? 
1.4.1 Solving the First Part
e basic thought must be that knowing how and intelligent behaviour are somehow  
interestingly related, and since the intellectualist legend is a theory of intelligent behaviour, it  
raises questions about knowing how. But we need to get a clear idea of what the relation is, or  
rather, what it could be given a fairly unsophisticated understanding of knowing how and  
intelligent behaviour. From the earlier discussion, we have the idea that intelligent behaviour  
means something like actions carried out intelligently. But this hardly clariﬁes things, since we 
need some idea of what carried out intelligently means. We are not, at this stage at least, aer an 
idea of what it means for behaviour to be intelligent, a theory of intelligent behaviour of which  
the intellectualist legend is an example. Rather, we want to know what that theory would have  
as its subject matter.
An initial thought in this direction, one which we can glean from Ryle's discussion, would be  
that an action counts as an instance of intelligent behaviour if 'intelligence-predicates' ( PA: 5) 
or 'intelligence epithets' (CM: 26) can be applied to it. ese divide into two kinds: positive 
terms including clever, sensible, careful, methodical, and their negative counterparts, stupid,  
silly, careless, unmethodical. So when we describe someone's action with one of the positive  
terms, we mean to say that the action was carried out intelligently, and hence is an instance of  
intelligent behaviour. As an example, consider two people playing chess: A manages to foresee  
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and exploit weaknesses in B's opening ; whereas A castles early and develops her queen  
dangerously, B contrives to make his back-row pieces ineﬀective and makes poor sacriﬁces. A 
played chess intelligently, and we can say that she was clever, sensible, careful, and so on; B, on  
the other hand, played chess unintelligently, and the opposite terms apply. 
One potential problem with this way of ﬁxing the range of actions that count as intelligent  
behaviour is that there seems to be some pull towards saying  that B's behaviour did display 
some intelligence, since it required some level of intelligence to happen at all. B played chess  
badly, but we can stipulate that he did not make any illegal moves, and perhaps was capable of  
grasping the fact that A's strategy was superior to his own, even if he could not say exactly how  
or in what way. B's chess playing is diﬀerent from, say, B's sneezing; the latter is not the kind of  
action that requires intelligence, and there is a question of it displaying intelligence, whereas 
playing chess, however badly, does require and obviously displays some intelligence, if only in  
the sense that it is not the kind of activity in which creatures with limited mental capacities  
could engage. 
is seems to suggest the need to distinguish two apparently rival ways of ﬁxing what counts as 
intelligent behaviour: 
(IB1) S's Φ-ing counts as intelligent behaviour if exclusively positive intelligence  
epithet can be applied to it.
(IB2) S's Φ-ing counts as intelligent behaviour if Φ-ing displays intelligence.
e example of A and B and their chess game supports the idea that IB1-type intelligent  
behaviour is a narrower deﬁnition. Is the intellectualist legend a theory of IB1-type or IB2-
type intelligent behaviour? Initially, the answer would appear to be that it is a IB1-type theory,  
since Ryle introduces the topic of intelligence behaviour in the guise of a concern with a  
certain range of “mental-conduct concepts” (CM: 26) which he then goes on to illustrate with 
the intelligence epithets. One might also think that deﬁnition IB2 is no deﬁnition at all, since 
it can be asked how we know which actions display intelligence, and so while it may be trivially  
correct, it is unilluminating. But while the appearance of a conﬂict here is genuine, and both 
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points in favour of deﬁnition IB1 are valid, the choice is a false one. A third deﬁnition would 
satisfy both these points, but also capture the idea that B's chess playing, although careless and  
so on, was nevertheless an instance of intelligent behaviour:
(IB2*) S's Φ-ing counts as intelligent behaviour if positive intelligence epithets can be  
applied to it, even if negative epithets can also be applied.
Since we can say that B's chess playing was intelligent, although not as intelligent as A's, it  
counts as intelligent behaviour on this deﬁnitions. IB2* can therefore be understood as a way  
of delineating the range of intelligent behaviour along the same lines as IB1, but with the  
deﬁnition widened to include not just 'intelligent behaviour', where 'intelligent' is a term of  
special praise, but also when relatively neutral but indicating the necessary contribution of  
some degree of mental sophistication in the occurrence of the action in question. 
We should understand the intellectualist legend as a theory of what makes actions count as  
intelligent behaviour, and that the range of the actions in question is ﬁxed by reference to the 
application of intelligence epithets. Intelligence epithets therefore play an important but  
somewhat limited role in getting to grips with Ryle's discussion. I raise this point because a less  
limited view of the role can make Ryle's discussion seem problematic in some respects, which  
will be discussed below. A proviso that needs to be made is that the notion of an intelligence  
epithet, of either the positive or negative variety, has only been clari ﬁed by example, rather 
than by a perspicuous deﬁnition. But this is not such a deep worry about the eﬃcacy of the 
proposed deﬁnition; we can clarify what we are talking about in terms of intelligence epithets  
by reference to some obvious cases, rather than needing to worry about specifying what they  
are exactly. Although it is true that Ryle uses highly heterogeneous examples of intelligence  
epithets, it seems plausible to think that the basic idea is to use these terms to ﬁx the relevant 
phenomena. One can haggle over which terms do in fact do this, and whether they do so in a  
more or less straightforward way, but the basic idea can be preserved.
With IB2* in hand, something can be said about the relation between knowing how and  
intelligent behaviour. First, we need to bring in three assumptions, which should not be  
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obviously problematic even if they turn out to be incorrect in some detail on closer inspection.  
e ﬁrst assumption is that, in order to understand the concept of knowing how, one has to  
pay attention to the way in which knows how sentences are used: 'knowing how to Φ' is the 
name of what is ascribed with sentences of the form 'S knows how to Φ' (some authors prefer 
the term 'knowing how to' to avoid confusion with what is ascribed with sentences of the form  
'S knows how heavy/tall/far away/&c. something  is'. I will assume that the diﬀerence will be 
taken for granted throughout this essay). e second assumption is that the only values of 'to  
Φ' which can appear in intelligible knows how sentences are descriptions of actions that  
require intelligence, or to which intelligence epithets can apply. Compare
(i) B knows how to sneeze.
(ii) B knows how to play chess.
One might think it is diﬃcult to say what (i) could be used to communicate such that one  
would accept it as an apt statement, whereas the sense of (ii) is clear. Extrapolating a little, we  
can say that it is only intelligible to ascribe to someone a capacity with respect to an activity to  
which intelligence epithets can apply using knows how sentences. A worry about this thought  
is that (i) is not obscure, and one can think of cases where it can be used to communicate  
something deﬁnite. A diﬀerent way of putting the worry is that sneezing can be an intelligent 
activity. One can certainly think of cases where sneezing can be carried out intelligently. Here  
is one: a group of thieves propose to use sneezing as a signal that a security guard is coming,  
but the sneeze must be genuine since otherwise the ruse would become too obvious; the  
lookout therefore sniﬀs some ﬁnely ground pepper as a security guard comes into view, and  
sneezes at the right moment to warn her partners in crime. She sneezed intelligently. And  
surely, by extension she knows how to sneeze. But sneezing was supposed to be an example of  
something that is not intelligent behaviour.
Does this throw the second assumption into doubt? I think not. Suppose we call action  
descriptions of the form 'to Φ' bare inﬁnitive descriptions, then both (i) and (ii) contain bare 
inﬁnitive descriptions. e diﬀerence between them is that, whereas 'to play chess' is a bare  
inﬁnitive description of an action that always displays intelligence, 'to sneeze' is not. While it is  
27
Ryle on Knowing How
wrong to say that (i) lacks any sense, it is true that one needs to work a little harder to think of  
cases in which it can be used to communicate some information. Such cases will be ones where  
the bare inﬁnitive description can be expanded to include details that bring in intelligence. So  
for instance, in the case just described, the lookout knows how to sneeze as a way of warning  
her partners. So the suggestion is that bare inﬁnitival descriptions can feature in knows how  
sentences even if they do not describe actions to which intelligence epithets apply in  
themselves. But the point that we need to expand the action description beyond the bare  
inﬁnitive in order to make sense of those that do not demonstrates that assumption two is a  
reasonable one to make.
e third assumption is that when we use a knows how sentence, we mean to indicate certain  
facts about a person with respect to the kind of action picked out by 'to Φ', which, from the 
ﬁrst and second assumption, we know will be actions that require intelligence. In particular, we  
mean to communicate that that person is someone who, with respect to that action, has some  
sort of capacity. So for instance, in asserting that A knows how to play chess, we mean to  
indicate that A is able to engage in chess playing. If it turned out that A was in fact unable to  
play chess, not even to the poor standard set by B, then one would withdraw the assertion. We 
oen talk about capacities, using capacity terms such as 'is able to Φ', 'can Φ', 'could Φ', &c., to 
indicate the positive likelihood to some salient degree of success. One must be careful with talk 
of capacities, since this is not the only way capacity terms can be used. ey can be used to 
indicate the possibility of the speciﬁed action occurring, which can be present in even in the  
absence of it being likely. Capacity terms can also be used to indicate that the action is  
permitted, although it is less common to talk about normative capacities (perhaps it provides a  
way of talking about authority, as in 'she had the capacity to walk on the grass although it was  
usually forbidden.') 
In any case, possessing a capacity in the sense relevant here means, as a ﬁrst pass, that one  
would likely be successful in the speciﬁed action, rather than that it is possible that one carries  
out the action or that carrying out the action would not be wrong in some way. ere may well 
be circumstances which are too demanding, but in reasonably compliant circumstances, if one  
has the capacity to Φ one would be successful in Φ-ing. In other words, possessing a capacity in 
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this sense means being reliably successful. is as well as the possibility sense of a capacity can  
come apart. It may be that, at some particular time, in some particular set of circumstances, it is  
simply impossible for one to carry out the action in question, although one remains reliably  
successful. And it may be that, at some particular time, one is in some particular set of  
circumstances that does not prevent one from carrying out the action, but it is not the case  
that one is reliably successful.
One may think, given these three assumptions, one can deﬁne knowing how as reliable success  
in carrying out intelligent actions. Deﬁning the state of knowing how in this way is open to  
obvious counter-examples, however. Suppose Irina the ice skater is reliably successful in pulling  
oﬀ a triple salchow, which is a complicated ice skating move. On the proposed de ﬁnition, we 
should say that Irina knows how to do a triple salchow. But conceivably the fact that Irina is  
reliably successful was due to some neural abnormality such that, whenever she intends to do a  
triple salchow, she ends up doing it correctly, although she would not were her neurology more  
conventional (this example, with a slight modiﬁcation, comes from Bengson, Moﬀett and 
Wright (2009); Bengson and Moﬀett (2007) also employ it, in a way to be discussed below).  
Does this mean that the third assumption needs to be rejected? If so, then capacities may have  
nothing to do with knowing how, but are anyway not suﬃcient.
Far from showing that knowing how has nothing to do with capacities, the counter-example  
shows that what it is to possess a capacity in the relevant sense needs to be glossed more  
precisely. e idea of reliable success only brings out part of what we mean when attributing a  
capacity to someone. Oen when we attribute a capacity to an individual, we mean to  
attribute the success to her, with the assumption that the reason she is successful can be found  
in facts about things for which she can claim (at least some, or perhaps su ﬃcient) 
responsibility. Having a capacity in this sense means that one is creditable for the success, and  
not merely the locus of the success - the person to whom successful action happens, as we  
might say. Reliable success in carrying out an activity is perhaps suﬃcient for one kind of 
capacity. We might call these success capacities. But we have already seen that capacities can be  
analysed in at least one diﬀerent way, as the presence of a possibility of an action being carried  
out. e counter-example of the neurally abnormal ice skater either demonstrates that  
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knowing how cannot be deﬁned in terms of success capacities, or suggests that there is no  
room for success capacities. But either way, if it is right that we also attribute capacities not just  
to indicate reliable success, but also to indicate that the reliable success is creditable to the  
individual to whom the capacity is being attributed, then there is a diﬀerent kind of capacity, 
namely, reliable and creditable success capacities. 
It is diﬃcult to deﬁne what, at the most basic level, it is for success to be creditable. I do not  
think this is a problem for present purposes. Notions like credit and cognate notions like  
responsibility are notoriously resistant to straightforward analysis. e notion of creditability 
can be articulated in a few ways. One way of doing this is to think in terms of luck, or rather  
the absence of luck. Creditable success necessarily non-lucky success. In a very clear discussion  
of these matters, Katherine Hawley (2003) uses this to draw some links between knowing how  
and externalist analyses of propositional knowledge. However, it is not obvious that the notion  
of luck is more basic than that of either credit or responsibility, and the likelihood of analysing  
the latter in terms of the former is not strong, although, as Hawley's discussion indicates,  
interesting suggestions and arguments can be made by drawing out the links between them.  
But the point that matters here is that the notion of credit, in the sense of crediting some state  
of aﬀairs to an individual, is a concept that does do genuine work in our thinking about  
actions, the agents that carry them out, and the relation between the two. e diﬀerence 
between Irina and a normal ice-skating counterpart who is not only successful but creditably  
so may be diﬃcult to locate at a fundamental level, but that does not mean there is no  
diﬀerence between them, and nor does it mean that we do not ﬁnd it relatively easy to track 
such diﬀerences. So it is surely very hard to deny that the notion of credit is one that does any  
work. One might have (or think one has) strong reasons to revise this state of a ﬀairs, but in 
that case one would be revising quite a lot else besides, including some of the basic  
presuppositions of the thought that there are individuals that know how to do things.
e third assumption, then, is that knows how sentences are used to indicate a capacity in the  
sense of reliable and creditable success. With these three assumptions in place, we can give a  
deﬁnition of the term 'knowing how'. Like the deﬁnition of intelligent behaviour, the idea is  
that this deﬁnes what a theory of knowing how would have as its subject matter. Taking  
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'knowing how' as the state attributed by knows how sentences used in this way, we can say
(Capacity Deﬁnition) Knowing how is the state of being able, in the sense of reliable  
and creditable success, to carry out the intelligent activity speci ﬁed by the relevant 
knows how sentence.
With knowing how so deﬁned, it can be seen how the refutation of the intellectualist legend as  
a theory of intelligent behaviour prompts the negative claim about knowing how. ere is, 
however, still a diﬃculty. Abilities are not actions. e two belong to quite diﬀerent categories. 
Actions are events, whereas abilities are standing states. at this is so is enough to create  
diﬃculties in getting a logical transition from the intellectualist legend, which is a theory of  
actions of a certain kind, to knowing how, which is not an action of any kind. e connection 
being proposed is thematic. Both are topics in the general area of intelligent activity, and this  
may be as close as one can get in tying the two together.
1.4.2 e Second Part
To get a solution to the second question, it would help to see quite why it is so puzzling that  
Ryle goes from refuting the intellectualist legend to mentioning knowing that. 'Knowing that'  
is a name given to what, in many other contexts, is referred to as propositional knowledge. e 
claims IL1-2 say nothing about the idea of propositional knowledge. ey do, however, 
mention something that bears some similarity to propositional knowledge. According to IL2,  
intelligent behaviour consists in actions which are controlled by intellectual operations. An  
intellectual operation is an act of contemplating a proposition, what we have had occasion to  
think of as an occurrent conscious mental state with propositional content. Propositional  
knowledge can be described in similar terms, viz. as a mental state with propositional content,  
but not identical terms. e two key diﬀerences are these. One is that propositional knowledge 
is not usually thought of as an occurrent or  conscious mental state. at it is not conscious 
means that one does not need to be consciously entertaining thoughts in order to be in a state  
of knowing a proposition. at it is not occurrent means that it is a standing condition, rather  
than a state that depends on a process taking place. e second diﬀerence is that propositional 
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mental states need not have the epistemic status of knowledge. One can think that the cat is on  
the mat despite not knowing that the cat is on the mat. But one obviously cannot know that  
the cat is on the mat despite not knowing that the cat is on the mat. So there is a clear need to  
distinguish propositional knowledge from occurrent and/or conscious propositional mental  
states, and to distinguish it from propositional mental states in general.
e point that the intellectualist legend does not require the theoretical operations to consist  
of relations to propositions that are known suggests that there is no clear philosophical answer 
to the second question. at is, there is no philosophical claim which would explain why  
propositional knowledge appears in Ryle's statement of negative view. However, the fact that  
propositional knowledge is a kind of propositional mental state, and not only that, but could  
perhaps be considered the paradigm of such states that have truth as their aim (as it is  
sometimes put), does suggest a way of making sense of it. e idea would be that, since  
propositional knowledge is a paradigm propositional mental state, it is used to stand for the  
more general category. From a stylistic perspective, the idea of contrasting knowing how with  
knowing that does have a pleasing symmetry. But from a philosophical perspective, it is in  
danger of being misleading. As stated, it appears as though what is at issue with the  
intellectualist legend is the relation between two kinds of knowledge. is is oen how it has 
been interpreted, as will be seen below. e interpretation being recommended here suggests  
that, in fact, one of those kinds of knowledge, knowledge that, is really standing in for  
propositional mental states in general and the other, knowing how, is involved primarily  
because of its relation to intelligent behaviour. Ryle's statement of the negative view, the claim  
that knowing how cannot be deﬁned in terms of knowing that, should be treated with care;  
looking at the relationship between its elements and the elements of the intellectualist legend  
shows it to be something slightly diﬀerent from how it appears.
So even if the intellectualist legend does not require the regulative propositions to be known  
by the agent, it does require that the agent be in some sort of propositional mental state with  
respect to those propositions.  We have also seen that 'knowing how' can be use for the  
conditions necessary and suﬃcient for a capacity to engage in an intelligent activity picked out  
by the relevant knows how sentence. So if knowing how stands for these conditions, and if  
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they cannot be deﬁned in terms of propositional mental states, then this  suggests the following 
interpretation of Ryle's negative view as the most plausible:
(RNV) Being reliably and creditably successful with respect to an intelligent activity  
does not constitutively require being in any propositional mental state.
e term 'constitutively' is meant to mark the point that the debate is over whether the  
psychological state of knowing how requires propositional mental states. It might be necessary  
for knowing how in the sense that if one knows how to do something then necessarily 2+2=4.  
But mathematical truths are not constitutive conditions on (the vast majority) of  
psychological states. However, a worry that could be raised about this interpretation relates to  
the second part of the puzzle about the distinctness thesis. Ryle might be thought rather to be 
claiming:
(RNV*) Being reliably and creditably successful with respect to an intelligent activity  
does not constitutively require being in any conscious propositional mental state.
A conscious propositional mental state, let's say, is one where the person having it is aware of  
that fact. RNV implies RNV*, but not vice versa, and so the former is a stronger and more  
general claim. But which is the better interpretation of Ryle? One might think that, since Ryle  
states the distinctness thesis as a gloss on his refutation of the intellectualist legend, and since  
the intellectualist legend is a theory of intelligent behaviour that appeals to a certain kind of  
conscious propositional mental state, then we should understand the distinctness thesis as  
RNV*. 
Adopting RNV* arguably misses the fact that it is not the consciousness of the acts of  
considering the regulative propositions that is important to Ryle's argument. What gets the  
regress started is that the intellectualist legend posits a certain kind of causal antecedent to  
instances of intelligent behaviour which are themselves instances of intelligent behaviour.  
ese antecedents are, as it happens, conscious propositional mental states. But, while it could  
be true or it could be false that all propositional mental states which are instances of intelligent  
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behaviour are conscious, this is not their most important feature. Since it would appear that  
Ryle thinks his negative view follows from the refutation of the intellectual legend, and since  
the consciousness of the propositional mental states at issue in the intellectualist legend is not  
of primary importance for the refutation, then this suggests that to choose RNV* over RNV  
would be to miss this point. A second point in favour of RNV is that adopting RNV* as the  
correct interpretation means that Ryle's use of 'knowing that' is doubly misleading, as it would  
need to stand for a particular kind of propositional mental state, rather than propositional  
mental states in general. Not only that, but the idea that propositional knowledge, knowing  
that, should stand in for conscious mental states is hard to justify. And yet this seemed to be a  
good way of making sense of the statement of the negative view. Propositional knowledge is  
not something that requires constant awareness of it; one can know, for instance, that the cat is  
on the mat even when one is asleep. On this showing, the unadorned RNV would be the  
better interpretation.
is raises a diﬀerent worry, however, which is that RNV does not receive any warrant from  
the refutation of the intellectualist legend. RNV says  that propositional mental states do not  
play a necessary role in the possession of a capacity for intelligent behaviour. e intellectualist 
legend holds propositional mental states to be necessary for a capacity for intelligent  
behaviour, not as such, but in a particular capacity, as causal antecedents of manifestations of  
the capacity. ese causal antecedents are supposed to be occurrent propositional mental states. 
is suggests that the correct interpretation of the negative view is rather
(RNV**) Being reliably and creditably successful with respect to an intelligent activity  
does not require being in any occurrent propositional mental state.
Again, RNV** is a more speciﬁc version of RNV, and hence a somewhat weaker claim. One  
problem with this, however, is that the intellectualist legend had better not be understood as  
claiming that occurrent propositional mental states are necessary for reliable and creditable  
success. If this was so, then the claim would be that one had a capacity to engage in an  
intelligent activity only so long as one of the anterior intellectual operations was taking place.  
Abilities would go in and out of one's possession depending on what one was thinking about.  
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Aside from being implausible by itself, there is no obvious reason why this should be a  
consequence of the intellectualist legend. RNV** also shares with RNV* the problem that  it 
makes Ryle's negative view once again obscure. e suggestion was that knowing that, or  
propositional knowledge, stands in as a kind of paradigm for a more general kind of mental  
state. But one of the markers of propositional knowledge is that it is unlike an act of  
considering a proposition in that it is not an occurrent mental state. So far as this point is  
concerned, being conscious and being occurrent are properties of propositional mental states  
which are irrelevant for the interpretation of the negative view. In a version of this sort of  
erroneous interpretation, Sax (2010:508) says that what Ryle “sometimes called ‘knowledge-
that'” was “intelligent deliberation”. We have already had occasion to remark on the distance  
between knowledge and acts, and this goes for propositional knowledge and intelligent  
deliberation just as well. It seems highly implausible to think that Ryle was guilty of making  
the mistake (a category mistake?) of equating the two. 
RNV* and RNV** are both ways of specifying the kind of propositional mental states that, on  
Ryle's negative view, are not among the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for all capacities for 
intelligent activity. e speciﬁcations are suggested by the nature of the propositional mental  
states that ﬁgure in the intellectualist legend. e intellectualist legend is, in this way, itself a  
speciﬁcation of the general proposition which Ryle's negative view, in the guise of RNV, denies.  
e main problem with the speciﬁcations in RNV* and RNV** is that they make the mention 
of propositional knowledge, knowing that, in the negative view mysterious or misleading. But  
if RNV is the correct interpretation, this  means that we must conclude Ryle has made a  
mistake, since he presents it as directly following from the refutation of the intellectualist  
legend. ere is, however, again a logical gap here. In order to have a valid argument in support  
of RNV, one would need a bridging assumption, along the lines of:
(Bridging Assumption) Being reliably and creditably successful with respect to an  
intelligent activity requires being in a propositional mental state only if acts of  
considering propositions are among the necessary antecedents of instances of  
intelligent behaviour. 
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is assumption would make the truth of the general proposition depend on the truth of the  
speciﬁc proposition. Whether or nor it or some variant is plausible, it should not distract from  
the fact that Ryle does not oﬀer any bridging assumption, let alone an argument for such a  
proposal, and instead presents RNV as a direct consequence of, or as a gloss on, the refutation.  
e upshot of this is that if Ryle's negative view is given its most plausible interpretation, one  
must conclude that Ryle has not presented an argument or even any motivation for it. e 
transition puzzle, as a puzzle about how to interpret the claims, is solved only due to there  
being a thematic link. e idea is that both the intellectualist legend and the negative view are  
claims about the relation between propositional mental states and intelligent activity. But this  
link can only take us so far. Using it to try to establish a logical  link generates incoherence in 
the interpretation of either or both. So we should conclude that Ryle has at this stage failed to  
motivate RNV.
1.5 e Positive Account
Up to now only the negative part of the Rylean theory has been considered. An interesting  
feature of the section of chapter two of CM entitled 'e Positive Account of Knowing How' 
is that the problem of providing this account is not initially set up in terms of knowing how at  
all, but rather in terms of intelligent behaviour:
But if to perform intelligently is to do one thing and not two things, and if to  
perform intelligently is to apply criteria in the conduct of the performance itself,  
it remains to show how this factor does characterise those operations which we  
recognise as skilful, prudent, tasteful or logical. (CM: 40)
With the earlier clariﬁcation regarding the link between knowing how and intelligent  
behaviour, we can make sense of this. According to the capacity deﬁnition of knowing how, it 
is a capacity for intelligent behaviour, and the positive account of knowing how is an account  
of the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for such a capacity. e explanatory problem comes 
from the need to balance two ideas when giving such an account. e ﬁrst has already been 
encountered; the thought is that intelligent behaviour does not involve two processes, one of 
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thinking, and one of practical execution, where the thinking process is prior to and controls  
the practical execution. e second idea, that intelligent behaviour involves the application of  
criteria, has not been explicitly argued for up to this point, but it can be viewed as a kind of  
concession to the intellectualist legend, which holds that performing intelligently is to apply  
criteria through the prior process of thinking about it. is way of accounting for how criteria 
or rules are to be applied is in conﬂict with the ﬁrst idea. Ryle seems to want to admit that  
there is something right about the construal of an instance of intelligent behaviour as a  
performance that involves applying rules. So the explanatory problem is to account for this 
while not making the same mistakes as the intellectualist legend.
When discussing the motivations for the intellectualist legend. Ryle concedes that “there may  
be no visible or audible diﬀerence between [e.g.] a tactful or witty act and a tactless or  
humourless one,” but dismisses the idea that “the diﬀerence is constituted by the performance or 
non-performance of some extra secret acts.” (CM: 33; emphasis added) Ryle proposes that the 
factor which merits the evaluation of an action as intelligent is to be explained by an invisible 
or inaudible feature of the action, but identiﬁes this feature as “a disposition, or complex of  
dispositions.” (ibid.) e positive account is based on the idea that the necessary and suﬃcient 
condition for a capacity for intelligent behaviour can be understood as a kind of acquired  
disposition, or what Ryle calls 'second nature' (cf. CM: 41). In ﬁlling out this suggestion, Ryle 
distinguishes two sorts of second nature, intelligent capacities on the one hand, and habits on 
the other:
It is of the essence of merely habitual practices that one performance is a replica  
of its predecessors. It is of the essence of intelligent practices that one  
performance is modiﬁed by its predecessors. (CM: 42)
Habits, having relatively uniform manifestations, are what Ryle calls single-track dispositions. 
ese generally give the form of dispositions by which that concept is introduced, because they  
are the simplest kind, and “it is initially helpful to fasten on the simplest models, such as the  
brittleness of glass or the smoking habit of a man.” ( CM: 43) e brittleness of the glass is a 
dispositional property of the glass which can be glossed as the property of being disposed to  
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shatter when dropped, and the habit of smoking is a dispositional fact about someone which  
can be glossed as the property of being disposed to smoke at certain times of the day or in  
certain situations. ese are dispositional properties whose manifestation (shattering ,  
smoking) are relatively uniform. Hence one performance of an habitual practice is 'a replica of  
its predecessors' because habits are single-track dispositions. Intelligent capacities on the other  
hand are multi-track dispositions.  Unlike single track dispositions, multi-track dispositions  
have “actualisations which take a wide and perhaps unlimited variety of shapes.” (ibid.) ese 
are dispositions whose exercises are “indeﬁnitely heterogeneous.” (CM: 44) Whereas single-
track dispositions are manifested in occurrences which are all highly similar, multi-track  
dispositions may be manifest in ways which are highly dissimilar.
ere are a couple of questions about the nature of these multi-track dispositions the answers  
to which can help with getting to grips with the details of the positive account, according to  
which knowing how has something to do with intellectual capacities, which consist in  
acquired multi-track dispositions. e two questions are, ﬁrstly, what accounts for the 
heterogeneity of the dispositions' manifestations? and secondly, if the manifestations of these  
dispositions are, as Ryle seems to suggest, highly heterogeneous, then what accounts for these  
manifestations being manifestations of one and the same disposition? e answer to the ﬁrst 
question can be seen by bringing into the account one half of the explanatory problem, which  
was to make room for the idea that applying criteria to one's action is part of what makes  
intelligent behaviour intelligent. Something along these lines can be gleaned from Ryle's  
discussion of the intelligent reasoner:
Underlying all the other features of the operations executed by the intelligent  
reasoner there is the cardinal feature that he reasons logically, that is, that he  
avoids fallacies and produces valid proofs and inferences, pertinent to the case he  
is making. He observes the rules of logic, as well as those of style, forensic strategy,  
professional etiquette and the rest. But he probably observes the rules of logic  
without thinking about them. (CM: 47; emphasis added)
Taking this example, we might say the following: suppose the intelligent reasoner is engaged in  
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proving the proposition that all Xs are Ys. She has a choice between two ways of attempting  
this; one is a fallacious inference form (aﬃrming the consequent, say), while the other is a valid  
form. e intelligent reasoner will reason in accordance with the rules of logic, and so will  
carry out the proof using the valid inference. Now suppose that, on two di ﬀerent occasions, 
our intelligent logician is called upon to prove that all Xs are Ys. On one occasion - at a  
conference, say - the rules of professional conduct demand that she does so concisely and using  
the proper technical terminology. On a separate occasion - on a relaxed evening with an  
audience of non-logicians - the rules of style and friendly relations demand that curt brevity  
and jargon would be out of place. On both occasions, she proves that all Xs are Ys, but she will  
carry out this performance in two quite diﬀerent ways. Not only that, but carrying out the  
proof in the manner demanded on the relaxed evening would be unintelligent when called  
upon to do so at the conference, and vice versa.
Abstracting from this example, suppose that our subject S is called upon to Φ, and that Φ-ing 
is a determinable action, in the sense that one can Φ either by Γ-ing or Δ-ing (and perhaps so 
on for indeﬁnite diﬀerent determinations). S is someone who has an intelligent capacity for Φ-
ing, and so applies rules or criteria to her performances of that action. Whether or not she Φs 
by Γ-ing or Δ-ing depends on what these rules demand. And let us suppose that on a particular  
occasion, the rules dictate that S Φs by Γ-ing, whereas she would have done it by Δ-ing had the 
occasion been diﬀerent. In both cases, the Φ-ing was a manifestation of an intelligent capacity; 
but the manifestations of it were diﬀerent, and so the disposition qualiﬁes as multi-track. 
What explains the multi-track nature of intelligent capacities, then, is that they involve the  
application of rules, and applying rules will result in diﬀerent manifestations on diﬀerent 
occasions. e idea, then, is that someone possesses an intelligent capacity if certain  
counterfactual statements are true of them, and the truth of these counterfactuals is due to the  
fact that they have learned the relevant rules of behaviour.
But what about the second question? One might worry that there is nothing to split the  
diﬀerence between saying that on the two occasions S displayed, not one, but two dispositions,  
one related to Γ-ing, and another to Δ-ing. In which case, it would seem diﬃcult to talk about 
intelligent capacities for carrying out determinable kinds of behaviour at all. Intelligent  
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capacities would relate only to determinate actions, and so the account of how regulative  
propositions play a role in intelligent behaviour would be problematic. To get around this, one  
would need a non-ad hoc reason to group certain kinds of determinate kinds of actions under  
the umbrella of being manifestations of a capacity to carry out a determinable kind of action  
intelligently. Ryle oﬀers a clue about how to solve this problem in the section where he  
discusses the motives of the intellectualist legend. e example is a clown who trips and 
tumbles as a manifestation of intelligence in contrast to someone who trips and tumbles out of  
clumsiness:
e clown's trippings and tumblings are the workings of his mind, for they are his 
jokes; but the visibly similar trippings and tumblings of a clumsy man are not the  
workings of that man's mind. For he does not trip on purpose. (CM: 34; emphasis 
added)
is helps us with the second question, since we can say that what allows us to say that the  
diﬀerent manifestations involving actions which are determinations of a determinable action is  
that the agent intends to carry out the determinable action, and brings o ﬀ this intention by 
doing one of the determinate actions. is also helps understand why the dispositions should  
be multi- rather than single-track. When our intelligent logician is called on to prove that all  
Xs are Ys, she does so intentionally. ere are better and worse ways of doing this according to  
the situation, and the rules that she has learned set constraints or make recommendations  
regarding what these are. is suggests that the deﬁnition of an intelligent capacity should read 
as follows:
(Intelligent Capacity) S has an intelligent capacity for Φ-ing if and only if S is disposed 
to act in accordance with learned rules in attempts to bring oﬀ an intention to Φ.
One point of clariﬁcation needed here is that the rules mentioned in the de ﬁnition of an 
intelligent capacity will sometimes be relevant because they dictate how one's attempt to Φ can 
be successful; but this is not the only way they can be relevant, since sometimes there may be  
multiple ways to successfully bring oﬀ the intention, but that one way of doing so will be better  
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than others. So one could intend to Φ, and do this in a way that was appropriate to the  
situation and hence according to the relevant rules, even though one was indi ﬀerent in terms 
of one's intentions as to whether or not one did it appropriately or not. So one need not intend  
to Φ appropriately in order for the rules governing how to Φ appropriately in the situation to  
be relevant. A second point of clariﬁcation is that the deﬁnition does not entail that one can 
only manifest an intelligent capacity in intentional action in the sense of action with a prior 
intention.
A question arises about the full generality of this account. Is it the case that, for all intelligent  
activities, one is creditably successful only if one has learned the rules? ere is no reason to 
think so. What is right is that for some activities, and for some individuals, their being  
creditable with being reliably successful (and it not being the case that their reliable success is  
merely something that happens to them), a process of learning, perhaps by self-conscious  
training or gradual acquisition, is what explains this fact. But if the target is to give an account  
of the conditions on an agent being creditably successful, then the learning of rules is too 
strong. What does seem right is that the disposition to act in accordance with the rules must  
be acquired. And it also seems right that the disposition must be acquired in the right way. But  
that this acquisition must amount to a process of learning is not clear. Learning is one in which  
the acquisition of the disposition may be such that it is acquired in the right way, but it need  
not be the only way. So for the time being 'learning' must stand in for a speci ﬁcation of 
'acquired in the right way', as an exemplar.
So much for the notion of an intelligent capacity. According to Ryle's positive account, to  
know how to Φ consists in the possession of one of these capacities:  “[k]nowing how [...] is a 
disposition, but not a single-track disposition like a reﬂex or a habit.” (CM: 46). Given that 
knowing how is being understood as a capacity to engage in the relevant intelligent activity,  
Ryle's positive account can be given as:
(RPV) S is reliably and creditably successful with respect to an intelligent activity Φ-
ing if and only if S is disposed to act in accordance with properly acquired rules in  
attempts to bring oﬀ an intention to Φ.
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RPV says that knowing how consists in the possession of an intelligent capacity, as de ﬁned 
above. So according to the Rylean theory of knowing how, the conjunction of RNV and RPV,  
if one knows how to Φ, one need not be in any propositional mental state, but one must be  
disposed to act in a certain way, as speciﬁed by rules one has acquired in the right.
RPV and the capacity deﬁnition which, according to the interpretation being recommended  
here, the Rylean theory employs are obviously very closely related. But it is important to see  
that they are distinct. According to Snowdon (2004), the positive account plays a role in the  
transition from the refutation of the intellectualist legend to the negative view is explained by  
a claim that Ryle makes, an assumption that he makes, and the nature of the explanatory  
project undertaken by the intellectualist legend. e claim Ryle makes is that “the so-called 
'intelligence epithets' stand for abilities or capacities;” (op. cit.: 17) the assumption “ is that 
knowing-how ascriptions ascribe capacities and abilities.” (ibid.) is is an assumption that 
earlier was outlined under the capacity deﬁnition. From this, it seems to follow that “what is  
ascribed by an intelligence epithet can also be ascribed by a knowing-how claim.” (ibid.) If this  
is right, then “the theory of intelligence epithets can be expressed in terms of 'know how'  
ascriptions.” (ibid.) is result would explain the transition from the refutation of the  
intellectualist legend to the claims about knowing how, since the intellectualist legend “is a  
theory about what Ryle calls 'intelligence epithets', or the properties they ascribe.” (op. cit.: 24) 
e problem is that 
without that second assumption about knowing how […] there is no reason to  
bring knowing how into the discussion at all, the primary focus of which is  
getting straight about intelligence epithets and not about knowledge ascriptions.  
So Ryle's views about knowing how do not contribute at all to the dissolution of  
the intellectualist legend; instead, they merely lead him to talk about knowing  
how, to bring it in. (ibid.)
e thought is that the assumption about knowing how is all that links the refutation with the  
claims about knowing how. is is problematic because, as Snowdon sees it, the assumption  
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about knowing how is equivalent to what he terms the capacities thesis, or CT, which is the 
claim that knowing how ascriptions ascribe abilities. is, on Snowdon's interpretation, is the  
content of Ryle's positive account. So one only gets the connection between the intellectualist  
legend and knowing how if one has already assumed the positive account.
is interpretation of the link between the refutation and the claims about knowing how  
obviously runs counter to what was proposed above. e problem on Snowdon's interpretation 
disappears if the diﬀerence between the deﬁnition of knowing how with which Ryle is 
operating and the positive account of knowing how he gives is kept in view. e capacity 
deﬁnition says knowing how is reliable and creditable success with respect to an intelligent  
activity. It does not say that it is to be disposed to act in accordance with learned rules in  
attempts to bring oﬀ intentions. An intelligent capacity is what makes one reliably successful.  
Being disposed to change one's behaviour to ﬁt the circumstances in accordance to learned  
rules in order to bring oﬀ intentions is what explains the fact that, unless it is too demanding  
or simply impossible to do so, one is successful. Putting this in terms of necessary and suﬃcient 
conditions, we can say that the capacity deﬁnition says what a theory of knowing how should  
give necessary and suﬃcient conditions for, namely the state of being reliably and creditably  
successful in activities requiring intelligence. RPV does this by identifying a certain  
dispositional state (and in what follows I shall sometimes refer to it in this more general  
manner).
Ryle is not totally explicit in why one should accept RPV as the correct positive account of  
knowing how, in the guise of reliable success in bringing oﬀ intentions to carry out intelligent 
actions. Ryle provides (CM: 40-44) an introduction of the idea of an intelligent capacity, and  
the application of this idea to give the positive account of knowing how. But there is little said  
in favour of this application. It is possible that it is simply meant to be compelling on its own  
terms; there is evidence to think this is true, given that Ryle's view is widely accepted even in  
the absence of an argument for it. However, we might want to look for a slightly more  
sophisticated motivation. Taking being reliably and creditably successful in as an abbreviation 
for bring reliable and creditably successful in bringing oﬀ intentions to carry out some intelligent  
action, an intelligent capacity is meant to be necessary and suﬃcient for bring reliably 
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successful. is can be separated out into two propositions
(RPV1) If S is reliably and creditably successful with respect to an intelligent activity  
Φ, then S is disposed to act in accordance with rules in attempt to bring o ﬀ  an 
intention to Φ.
(RPV2) If S is disposed to act in accordance with learned rules in an intention to Φ, 
then S is reliably and creditably successful with respect to an intelligent activity.
e conjunction of these two propositions implies RPV. RPV2 seems uncontroversial. e 
rules governing an action specify how it is that one should act in order to successfully carry out  
that action. So if one is disposed to act in accordance with those rules, one will be reliably  
successful, and that success can attributed to one because one has learned the rules. is also 
works in the opposite direction, in favour of RPV1. If one is reliably successful, then one  
cannot do this without acting in accordance with the rules; and one cannot be credited with  
the success without having learned the rules. RPV is therefore motivated by re ﬂecting on the 
function of rules in determining how successful actions are carried out, and the role of learning  
those rules in that success being credited to the individual. 
At the conclusion of the previous section, we saw that Ryle fails to provide an argument or a  
motivation for RNV. Interestingly, one can see how RPV can be used to motivate RNV. If  
RPV is true, then possessing an intelligent capacity, a disposition to act in accordance with  
rules, is suﬃcient for reliable success. RNV follows from this, since propositional mental states  
are not necessary for that disposition. e positive account does not exclude propositional  
mental states from bring necessary for explaining reliable success in particular cases, but it does  
exclude propositional mental states from playing any necessary role in explaining reliable  
success as such. One could act in accordance with the rules without having any beliefs or other  
thoughts about what those rules are, or any beliefs or thoughts about anything else. Although  
it would be inaccurate to attribute this line of thought to Ryle, it does mean that the theory as  
a whole can be substantiated using the resources that Ryle had at his disposal.
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1.6 What the Rylean eory Is Not
I have already stressed that the capacity deﬁnition is not the same as the positive view. e 
positive view (given as RPV) is a positive claim about the necessary and suﬃcient conditions 
for reliable and creditable success, while the negative view (interpreted as RNV) is a negative  
claim about the necessary conditions for the same. ough RPV and RNV do not by 
themselves imply anything about knowing how, the addition of the capacity deﬁnition means 
that they do, and so qualiﬁes them to be part of a theory of knowing how. So  the capacity 
deﬁnition should be considered part of the overall Rylean theory of knowing how. However, as  
far as the argument in PA and chapter two of CM is concerned, whether or not the capacity  
deﬁnition of knowing how is accurate or not is not the main issue. Ryle does not argue for it,  
and so Snowdon is right to say that Ryle assumes something, but importantly it is the capacity 
deﬁnition, and not the positive view itself, which is assumed.
e formulation of the capacity deﬁnition given above has been adequate up to now. But if it is  
to be included along with RNV and RPV, an ambiguity needs to be resolved. ere are two 
diﬀerent ways of establishing RNV and RPV as claims about knowing how by appealing to the  
capacity deﬁnition according to how the capacity deﬁnition is construed. e capacity 
deﬁnition is eﬀectively ambiguous between either of two claims about how to analyse knows  
how sentences. On the strong analysis, reliable success is necessary and suﬃcient for knowing 
how. On the weak analysis, reliable success is is merely suﬃcient for for knowing how:
(Weak Analysis) S knows how to Φ if S is reliably and creditably successful with  
respect to Φ-ing.
(Strong Analysis) S knows how to Φ if and only if S is reliably and creditably successful 
with respecting to Φ-ing.
e capacity deﬁnition was meant to capture a way in which knows how sentences are used.  
Whereas the weak analysis leaves open the possibility that knows how sentences may be used  
in diﬀerent ways, the strong analysis implies that they may only used in this way. Both weak  
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and strong analyses are suﬃcient for the purpose of making RNV and RPV imply claims about  
knowing how. Since the capacity deﬁnition can be construed according to the weak analysis,  
Ryle is not committed to the strong analysis. From an interpretative point of view, all things  
being equal (and I assume all things are), it is better to attribute the weaker interpretation.  
Whatever else one thinks about how to approach the question of whether Ryle was committed  
to the strong or weak analysis, and whatever textual evidence might be adduced, this point is, I  
think, decisive in favour of the attribution of the weak analysis. So with that, a complete  
account of the Rylean theory can be given: RNV, RPV and the weak analysis.
A range of objections have been raised in response to Ryle's original discussion. Many of these,  
although directed at the Rylean theory, are more properly understood as objections to  
something somewhat diﬀerent. is is what I will refer to as the neo-Rylean theory. e second 
part of this essay will discuss what I take to be the most important of these objections and test  
their eﬃcacy with respect to the Rylean theory proper. At this stage, however, I want to  
contrast the Rylean theory with the neo-Rylean theory, with the aim of bringing out some  
important points about the former which will be relevant in that discussion. We have already  
come across the two main elements of the neo-Rylean theory. One is the idea that knowing  
how ascriptions always ascribe abilities. is was Snowdon's CT, mentioned in the previous  
section. e other is the idea that there is distinction between knowing how and knowing that.  
is was Stanley and Williamson's understanding of Ryle's negative view; Snowdon terms this  
the distinctness thesis, or DT. 
Attribution of variations of CT and DT to Ryle, in addition to Snowdon, are common in the  
literature on knowing how, both by those sympathetic and hostile to what they take to be  
Ryle's position. Attributions of these views to Ryle can also be made implicit by an  
endorsement or an attack on arguments against these views. Here are some further examples of  
explicit attribution of DT:
“Ryle believed that knowledge-that and knowledge-how were diﬀerent types of  
knowledge, such that if one were to confuse or conﬂate them she would be 
making a category mistake.” (Adams, 2009: 2; emphasis added)
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“Gilbert Ryle... famously argued that there was a fundamental distinction 
between knowledge-how and knowledge-that.” (Cath, 2009: 137; emphasis 
added)
“In short, we can ascribe two main theses to Ryle’s account, namely a negative  
one according to which knowledge-how cannot be reduced to or equated with  
knowledge-that, and a positive one according to which  knowledge-how in fact  
consists in certain abilities or capacities to perform a task successfully” ( Jung & 
Newen, 2010: 114; emphasis added)
e last quotation also contains an attribution of CT. Here are some further examples:
“For Ryle, knowing how is ability.” (Kumar, 2011: 137)
“...an ascription of the form “x knows how to F” merely ascribes to x the ability to 
F.” (Stanley and Williamson, op. cit.: 416)
“Ryle (1948, p. 33) [held] that: ∀s∀ϕ (s knows how to ϕ  just in case she has the 
actual ability to ϕ).” (Williams, 2008: 109)
“Ryle equates knowing-how with ‘acquired dispositions’ and holds, therefore, that 
they become manifest in the execution of certain abilities.” ( Jung & Newen, op.  
cit.: 114; emphasis added.)
e neo-Rylean theory consists of Snowdon's DT and CT. e conﬂation of these claims with 
the Rylean theory is mistaken. First, the Rylean theory does not imply DT. Neither the  
individual components RNV, RPV or the weak analysis, nor any conjunction of those  
components, imply that there is a distinction, fundamental or otherwise, between knowing  
how or knowing that. e closest Ryle comes to this idea is his statement that knowing how  
cannot be deﬁned in terms of knowing that, which we have seen is best understood not as a  
claim about knowing that at all, but as a claim about the role of propositional mental states in  
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the analysis of a certain kind of ability. Moreover, Ryle makes statements that explicitly  
contradict DT, as in PA, where he says
I want to turn the tables and to prove that knowledge-how cannot be deﬁned in 
terms of knowledge-that and further, that knowledge-how is a concept logically  
prior to the concept of knowledge-that. (PA:4-5)
Since the claim that knowing how cannot be deﬁned in terms of knowing that is compatible  
with the reversed logical priority, it cannot be the case that it implies DT. So not only is there  
no positive evidence in favour of attributing that claim to him, there is positive evidence  
against it (this point is oen missed; Fantl (2008: 452) is a happy exception). It is also peculiar  
to think that, if Ryle is committed to the idea that knowing how can be thought of in  
dispositional terms, which is implied by the weak analysis plus RPV, that he should be  
especially concerned to show that it cannot be thought of in terms of propositional knowledge.  
It is hardly the case that, if a mental state is not to be thought of as a kind of disposition, then  
it ought to be thought of as a kind of a kind of special epistemological standing towards a  
proposition!  Moreover, 'knowing how' appears to be quite dispensable as a term in specifying  
the substance of what Ryle was talking about. So there is really no need to talk about  
knowledge at all. To imply, or to state outright, that Ryle was concerned with kinds of  
knowledge and their logical relationships is therefore misleading.
DT, is in any case, not a precise claim. e idea that two mental state types are distinct is open 
to a number of diﬀerent interpretations. On one understanding, it might mean that being in  
one state does not imply being in the other. On a diﬀerent understanding, it might mean that 
being in one state does not constitute being in the other, where this could be true even if the  
implication did hold. On yet another understanding, it might mean that our concepts of those  
states do not coincide, where this could be true even if, as a matter of psychological fact, one  
state did partially constitute the other, or if the implication did hold for some other reason. In  
the speciﬁc case of knowing how and knowing that, it might also mean that two diﬀerent 
sentence forms are used to attribute mental states, which would be compatible with all three of  
the previous understandings. e point it is not always clear what content a version of DT  
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actually has. At this last level, it will cease to bare any resemblance to an interesting  
philosophical thesis and start to look like an obvious and trivial truth. Where what Ryle  
actually wrote is concerned, it is clear that no non-trivial version of DT can be attributed to  
Ryle. 
Nevertheless, it is worth noting the relation between it and the Rylean theory. If DT is true, if 
knowing how is distinct from knowing that in some way, then this lends some weight to the  
negative part of the Rylean theory, RNV, but of course does not prove it. If it is false, then this 
implies that the RNV is false, and this further implies that the positive part of the theory, RPV,  
is false also. So arguments against DT would, en passant, show that the Rylean theory is  
mistaken. To some extent, discussing DT with respect to Ryle is harmless and even useful; it  
will be the focus of much of the discussion in the second half of this essay. But it cannot be  
attributed to him, and mostly it is a distraction from what is actually at issue, which is whether  
RNV is true.
e objection to the attribution of CT is slightly diﬀerent. DT is diﬃcult to interpret, and 
anyway is clearly a misinterpretation of Ryle on all but the most trivial of understandings,  
given that it is incompatible with explicit statements he makes. Although CT is, I think,  
relatively clear, something similar holds true of the statements which I have grouped together  
as versions of CT. e reason they are unclear is one that should by now be familiar; the  
content of the claim depends heavily on how one treats the term 'knowing how'. ese claims 
can be understood either according to the strong or weak analysis mentioned above. On the  
strong analysis, one gets something like CT. We have already seen that one only needs the  
weak analysis to make sense of what Ryle says. e conjunction of RPV and the weak analysis  
implies only that knows how sentences can be used to attribute a disposition.
e problem with the statements that I grouped together as versions of CT is that they do not  
make clear what exactly is being claimed. Are they simply claims about what Ryle was talking  
about, i.e. a certain kind of ability? Or are they rather strong claims about how to analyse a  
certain kind of sentence? It is a mistake to think, just because a claim is about knowing how  
simpliciter that it is by default a claim of the latter kind. 'Knowing how' is not a transparent  
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term, and one needs to be clear about what a theory of knowing how is actually a theory of,  
otherwise there is a danger of pervasive obscurity. Ryle is largely to blame for this, since it is  
not hard to understand why one might think that he is interested in analysing knows how  
sentences. But on a more careful reading, as I have argued, there is no need to attribute the  
stronger claim to Ryle. So to the extent that CT is ambiguous between the stronger and the  
weaker, it needs to be treated with care. And it should also be added that, when put in context,  
many of those considering one or other of the various forms of CT clearly do take it to be the  
stronger claim to do with the analysis of knows how sentences (this is most apparent in the  
case of Stanley and Williamson), and this demonstrates the need for care even more.
Following on from this, we can identify the main diﬀerence between the Rylean theory and 
the neo-Rylean theory as follows: whereas both CT and DT are simply claims about knowing  
how, RNV and RPV are primarily claims about something else, namely, a particular kind of  
ability. e interpretative confusion that gives rise to the attribution of the neo-Rylean claims  
to Ryle perhaps comes from the fact that his account of what it is to have a capacity which  
takes the form of a formulation of necessary and suﬃcient conditions. But these are necessary  
and suﬃcient conditions for something that, on the weak analysis, is merely suﬃcient for a 
knows how sentence to be true of someone. Both the Rylean and neo-Rylean theories o ﬀer 
positive proposals of knowing how. e neo-Rylean theory identiﬁes knowing how with the 
possession of a capacity, so that possessing a capacity is necessary and su ﬃcient for knowing 
how. e Rylean theory identiﬁes the possession of a capacity with being in a certain kind of  
dispositional state, so that being in that state is necessary and suﬃcient for possessing that  
capacity, and says that possessing that capacity state is suﬃcient for knowing how. 
1.7 Summary
e content of the Rylean theory, to summarise are these three claims:
(RPV) S is reliably and creditably successful with respect to an intelligent activity Φ-
ing if and only if S is disposed to act in accordance with properly acquired rules in  
attempts to bring oﬀ an intention to Φ.
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(RNV) Being reliably successful with respect to an intelligent activity does not require  
being in any propositional mental state.
(Weak Analysis) S knows how to Φ if S is reliably successful with respect to Φ-ing.
A consequence of adopting this interpretation which may be surprising is that for the purpose  
of characterising Ryle's discussion, knowing how is quite dispensable, given that it is RPV and  
RNV that provide the real meat of the theory. e weak analysis is brought in to explain the  
vocabulary Ryle chooses to use, more than being an explicit commitment with respect to the  
semantics of knows how sentences. is is not a defect of the interpretation. Rather, it reﬂects 
an aspect of Ryle's discussion which is easy enough to miss if one was tempted to read into Ryle  
claims that are not there. Ryle's concern is to give an account of behaviour distinctive in being  
intelligent. is motivates an account of abilities, in the sense of reliable and creditable success  
with respect to such activity. RPV and RNV provide the account, which is also an account,  
albeit perhaps a partial one, of knowing how as a consequence of the weak analysis of knows  
how sentences. Together, these three claims make up the Rylean theory of knowing how, of  
which the remainder of this essay presents a defence against intellectualist objections.
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2. Defence
e second part of this essay examines objections to the Rylean theory of knowing how  
informed by what I have referred to as intellectualism, the idea that knowing how  
constitutively requires being in propositional mental states.
2.1 Two Kinds of Objection
Objections to the Rylean theory can largely be placed into two categories: objections informed  
by psychological considerations, and objections informed by linguistic considerations (for a  
similar approach to objections to intellectualism, see Glick, forthcoming). at there should 
be objections of the ﬁrst kind is obvious. Ryle is concerned to make claims that bear on the  
nature of the mind, about the nature of intelligence and intelligent behaviour. Knowing how is  
a mental state, and claims about mental states must be answerable to other psychological  
claims. Objections of the second kind, by contrast, may initially seem to be peculiar. What  
should linguistics have to say of relevance to the nature of a mental state? e short answer is 
that knowing how is a linguistic artefact. is needs some explanation. 
In the discussion of the transition puzzle, in the course of getting at a de ﬁnition of knowing 
how that ﬁtted Ryle's use of that term, one of the assumptions was that it picks out something  
to do with sentences with a certain form, what I termed knows how sentences. e assumption 
is meant to follow from the fact, which I take to be obvious, that we have the notion of  
knowing how because of sentences with that form. It is in this way that knowing how is a  
linguistic artefact. Knowing how is not a linguistic artefact in a more controversial sense, the  
idea that it somehow depends on our use of sentences. e claim that knowing how is a 
linguistic artefact does not mean that no one would know how to do anything if we did not  
use sentences of that form. at would make a psychological phenomenon dependent on a  
linguistic phenomenon in a way that is patently absurd; but the idea that we pick out or carve  
up psychological reality, or divide up the kinds of mental states that we ﬁnd ourselves in, in  
terms of the ways in which we attribute those states, is not. To make this point clearer, we  
might distinguish between the phenomenon of knowing how with the concept of knowing  
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how. Since it depends on certain linguistic forms, it is clearly reasonable to consult linguistic  
evidence in an investigation of the concept. So the fact that knowing how is a linguistic  
artefact makes linguistics relevant.
To anticipate the topic of the next two sections, the reason for discussing the way in which  
linguistics is relevant is because an inﬂuential argument, due to Stanley and Williamson (op. 
cit.) that purports to be important, in a way to be discussed, for the truth of the Rylean theory  
relies on certain syntactic and semantic – i.e. linguistic - considerations. Section 2.3 will set out  
the reasons for rejecting the idea that the conclusion of that argument is a problem for the  
Rylean theory. But the very idea of consulting linguistic considerations has been rejected. To  
take a particularly clearly stated instance of this sort of view, Noë states that the problem with  
Stanley and William's approach is that  “it directs our attention to considerations about  
language (how people talk), when theorists of mind (in philosophy or cognitive science) are  
interested in human nature and the nature of mind.” (Noë, 2005: 289) Moreover, “that for  
which we seek an account [when investigating knowing how] is not our use of sentences.” (ibid.) 
On a more optimistic note, we are told that “[i]t is a mark of philosophical progress that we  
can now see that neither linguistic analysis nor cultivated intuitions are the key to  
understanding the nature of mind.” (op. cit.: 290)
e complaint in its strongest form seems to be that that linguistic considerations are  
irrelevant to psychology; in a slogan, the use of sentences do not matter for the nature of  
mental states. Rather than take aim at the slogan as such, we should ask how it stands with  
respect to knowing how in particular. It is true that claims about knowing how are  
psychological claims. But it would be wrong to insist that this is all they are. One would want  
to know why we should have the notion of knowing how as an object of investigation if not  
because of the kinds of sentences we use to attribute this state. To suggest that linguistic  
considerations are relevant for the investigation of the concept of knowing how is to suggest  
that claims about the concept of knowing how are also partly claims about logical  
commitments taken on by the use of the particular linguistic forms that are used to attribute  
knowing how. In this instance, these are sentences grouped together with reference to a  
particular sentence form in English, i.e. knows how sentences.
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And of course, making this suggestion is not to deny that claims about knowing how are  
psychological claims. A line is not being drawn between knowing how as a part of  
psychological reality, consisting of mental states and related items, and as a part of what we  
might call linguistic reality, consisting of sentences and related items, which psychologists and  
linguists investigate in isolation. Understanding the logical commitments of knows how  
sentences is part of understanding the concept of knowing how, and understanding the  
concept is at least part of the philosophical project of getting clear on the nature of that  
psychological state e idea that linguistic claims are not possibly relevant for our  
understanding of knowing how closes oﬀ an important avenue of investigation where this is  
little reason to do so. And more importantly, reﬂecting on the dependence of the idea of  
knowing how on our linguistic forms suggests it should be actively pursued, and Noë's  
complaint with respect to knowing how is therefore less than compelling. 
Without wishing to labour the point, it is important to consider why knowing how is a term in 
philosophical use, and what the import of that term is supposed to be. Doing so gives us a  
good reason to consider the meanings of the relevant sentences. at said, it is not a foregone 
conclusion that doing so will in fact reveal anything of interest, let alone anything that would  
count against the Rylean theory. But some philosophers, in particular Stanley and Williamson,  
have thought that it does, and that it shows the Rylean theory to be false. e next section 
considers their argument.
2.2 Stanley and Williamson's Linguistic Argument
e conclusion of Stanley and Williamson's argument (KT: 417-432) is that knowing how is a 
species of knowing that. is is the conclusion they call intellectualism (partly on the basis of  
the mistaken interpretation of the intellectualist legend, discussed above; for an alternative  
deﬁnition of this term that comes much closer to the correct interpretation, see Glick,  
forthcoming). e basis for this conclusion is an analysis of knows how sentences, on which it  
turns out that if, for instance, someone is said to know how to ride a bicycle, then this is true if  
and only if they know that w is a way of riding a bicycle. e idea is that knowing how is a  
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species of knowing that, because whenever someone can be said to know how to do something,  
this is true only if they know that something is the case. 
Stanley and Williamson provide the following argument for intellectualism: 
(LA1) Knows how sentences feature embedded questions.
(LA2) If knows how sentences feature embedded questions, then for any token knows  
how sentence 'S knows how to Φ', it is true if, and only if, there is some proposition p 
of the form 'w is a way of Φ-ing ' such that (a) p provides a true answer to the 
embedded question in the token knows how sentence, and (b) S knows that p.
(LAC) (LA1, 2) erefore, if S knows how to Φ, S knows that p. (i.e. intellectualism).
In order to get a better understanding of this argument, I will go through each premise in turn,  
with reference to Stanley and Williamson's discussion.
LA1 is a claim about the syntax of knows how sentences.. e idea is that sentences such as
(i) Anne knows how to do a pirouette.
(ii) Brian knows where to sign his name.
(iii) Catherine knows whom to call in an emergency.
(iv) Dennis knows why to be cheerful.
(v) Enid knows which career to choose.
can be distinguished from sentences such as 
(vi) Fred knows that the Sun is 91 million miles away from the Earth.
to the extent that, while (i) - (v) feature embedded indirect questions in untensed clauses, (vi)  
does not (KT: 417-8, 420). e syntactical structure of (i-v) can be given as follows, where  
PRO is “a phonologically null pronoun that occurs... in the subject position of untensed  
clauses” and t is the trace of the movement of the interrogative particle (KT: 419):
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(i*) Anne knows [how PRO to do a pirouette t].
(ii*) Brian knows [where PRO to watch television t].
(iii*) Catherine knows [whom PRO to call in an emergency t].
(iv*) Dennis knows [why PRO to be cheerful t].
(v*) Enid knows [which career PRO to choose t].
So according to “the standardly accepted syntax” ( KT: 420), embedded question 
constructions such as (i)-(v) are understood as syntactically similar to non-embedded question  
constructions such as (vi), in that they take a sentential compliment, where the bracketed 
untensed clauses in (i*)-(v*) are understood as sentences. Since 'knows how' sentences feature  
in the examples, we can say that 'knows how' sentences feature embedded questions, and hence  
take a sentential complement.
Whereas LA1 is a claim about the syntax of 'knows how' constructions, LA2 concerns the  
semantics of constructions with that syntax. e claim depends on what Stanley and 
Williamson refer to as the Karttunen semantics for indirect questions (Karttunen,  
1977/2002), which is itself a modiﬁcation of Hamblin's (1973) proposal to treat direct  
questions as denoting sets of propositions. e thought is that embedded indirect questions  
denote sets of propositions expressed using sentences that provide true answers. To take an  
example, the sentence 'Fred knows why the caged bird sings' features the embedded question  
'why the caged bird sings', which denotes the set of true propositions expressed by sentences of  
the form 'the caged bird sings for reason r'. So Fred knows why the caged bird sings if, and only 
if, Fred knows that the caged bird sings for reason r (KT: ibid). Whether or not Fred must 
know all the reasons, or merely some of the reasons, for the caged bird's singing depends on  
whether the sentence is used in a 'mention all' or 'mention some' context (KT: 421). According 
to Karttunen, providing the semantics for sentences such as (i)-(v), which includes knows how  
sentences, is therefore a matter of giving the proposition that provides the answer to the  
embedded question, and saying of the subject that they know that proposition. (It is  
interesting to note, however, that Karttunen rarely mentions 'how' constructions, since his  
main focus is on interrogative noun phrases.)
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As Stanley and Williamson note (KT: 422), the untensed clauses introduce some 
complications for this picture: ﬁrstly, it is not clear how 'PRO' be should interpreted, and  
secondly, it is not clear how the inﬁnitive should be interpreted. Each question presents two  
possibilities: either PRO should be interpreted as referring to the subject of the sentence, or it  
means something more general, in which case it can be interpreted as the general third  
personal 'one' ( KT: 424); and either the inﬁnitive expresses how the activity ought to be done, 
or alternatively how it may be done (KT: ibid.). is means that a sentence such as (i*) can be  
interpreted in four diﬀerent ways:
(i*) (a) Anne knows how she ought to do a pirouette
(b) Anne knows how one ought to do a pirouette.
(c) Anne knows how she could do a pirouette.
(d) Anne knows how one could do a pirouette.
Stanley and Williamson consider (i*a) and (i*b) to be clearly cases of describing a subject as  
knowing that something is the case, and since what is at issue is whether or not 'knows how'  
sentences describe a subject as knowing that something is the case, they are not the relevant  
contexts (KT:  42 5) .  e idea seems to be that knowledge of obligations is always  
propositional, though no argument for this is given.
Applying the Karttunen semantics to (i*c), it is true if, and only if, there is some way w such 
that Anne knows that w is a way of doing a pirouette. e idea is that the indirect questions  
featuring the interrogative particle 'how' denotes propositions that quantify over ways, in the 
same way that 'why' denotes propositions that quantify over reasons, 'where' over locations, 
'when' over times, 'who' over persons, and 'which' over individuals. Which ways are relevant will 
again depend on contextual factors (KT: 426). Ways are to be understood as “ways of engaging  
in actions.” (KT: 427) Such ways of engaging in actions are taken to be “properties of token  
events.” (KT: ibid.)
Intellectualism is therefore the result of combining the idea that 'knows how' sentence  
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constructions belong to the kinds of sentence constructions with an embedded question  
syntax, and the idea that the correct semantics for sentence constructions with an embedded  
question syntax involve feature the propositions that provide true answers to those questions.  
It is clear that, if this argument is correct, then RNV must be false. e combination of the 
syntactic and semantic claims imply that when we attribute the state of knowing how to do  
something, we also attribute to them the state of knowing that something is the case. Knowing  
that something is the case is a propositional mental state. is is an instance, then, of the way 
in which the strong claim that knowing how requires propositional knowledge implies the  
logically weaker claim that contradicts RNV. e argument is relatively simple and clearly 
valid, and consequently compelling. 
2.3 Response to the Linguistic Argument
Rumﬁtt (2003) has disputed the soundness of the argument. e problem he raises concerns 
LA1, the claim that knows how sentences have an embedded question syntax. is objection 
can be stated as follows (Rumﬁtt does not state it quite as strongly):
(R1) If there are non-English translations of English knows how sentences which do  
not have an embedded question syntax, then LA1 is false
(R2) ere are non-English translations of English knows how sentences which do not  
have an embedded question syntax.
(RC) So LA1 is false.
e examples of the non-English sentences provided by Rumﬁtt include the following French 
sentences (Rumﬁtt, op. cit.: 162)
(vi) Elle sait monter a vélo [she knows how ride a bicycle]
(vii) Il sait nager [he knows how to swim]
(viii) Il sait parler Français [he knows how to speak French]
ese sentences are translations of English knows how sentences. However, unlike the English  
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sentences, they do not have the feature which licenses the embedded question syntactic  
analysis, the presence of the interrogative particle. ere are other sentences which work as 
translations of English knows how sentences which do admit that analysis. But the translations 
which do not suggest that the logical form of English knows how sentences is ambiguous, since  
syntactically dissimilar sentences provide translations (op. cit.: 165-6). Since LA1 depends on a  
non-ambiguous logical form for English knows how sentences, the evidence adduced by  
Rumﬁtt undermines the support for the crucial syntactic premise. It might be the case that  
further analysis could overcome this problem, but Rumﬁtt provides reasons (op. cit.: 163-4)  
for thinking this will not turn out the be the case. e nature of the linguistic evidence, then, is 
such that LA1 is not well supported. and this carries over to the argument for intellectualism  
that relies on it.
Stanley (2011) has responded to this argument by arguing that the cross-linguistic data to  
which Rumﬁtt appeals is not enough to present a problem. Stanley understands Rumﬁtt to be 
providing an argument against intellectualism,(that is, the form of intellectualism stated in  
terms of knowledge), the conclusion of which is that “[i] n English, “knows” as it occurs in 
constructions such as “John knows how to ride a bicycle” does not ascribe propositional  
knowledge.” (op. cit.: 228) is is incorrect. Rumﬁtt explicitly says this is not meant to be the  
import of his objection (see Rumﬁtt, op. cit.: 158 - “I shall not challenge Stanley and 
Williamson's conclusion.”) But Stanley's response can be separated from his interpretation of  
Rumﬁtt's objection, so this can be ignored. e thought behind Stanley's response is that  
Rumﬁtt's objection presupposes that the linguistic argument turns on the fact that English  
knows how sentences contain a 'question word' or interrogative particle, and that it is this that  
does the work in requiring a semantics featuring propositions. Stanley claims that “ on many 
accounts of embedded questions, one can obtain the embedded question semantics without a  
question word.” (Stanley, op. cit.: 228) e interrogative particle is 'semantically void', and so  
cannot be what accounts for the correct semantic interpretation of sentences in which it  
ﬁgures. To illustrate this point, Stanley provides (op. cit.: 228-9) a way of getting a  
propositional semantics for sentences such as the French examples (vi-viii).
Ignoring the details of this account, it is interesting to note that Stanley does not argue that  
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this is the correct semantic interpretation, and he only claims that it is possible. So as to please 
neither party to this argument, one can assume that it remains an open question whether the  
cross-linguistic data presents a problem for the linguistic argument for intellectualism. is 
issue is, in any case, largely screened oﬀ by a diﬀerent problem, one which can be put in the  
form of a dilemma. e dilemma comes from the fact that, like the related claim that knowing  
how is distinct from knowing that, intellectualism is open to to diﬀerent interpretation. Just as  
what the distinction might amounts o is open to diﬀerent interpretations, this is also true for  
the seemingly opposite claim that knowing how is a species of knowing that. e ﬁrst horn of 
the dilemma is this: if intellectualism is understood as the claim that the psychological state of 
knowing how reduces to the psychological state of knowing that, then there are familiar 
epistemological counterexamples which make this assertion problematic. e second horn is 
this: to avoid the counterexamples, intellectualism must be understood as the weaker claim,  
that cases of knowing can be described without loss of meaning as cases of knowing that. So  
understood, intellectualism does not provide suﬃcient basis for contradicting RNV. Instead of 
getting the claim that if S knows how to Φ, S knows that p, one would only have a weaker form 
of intellectualism, the claim that if S knows how to Φ, then S can be described as knowing that 
p, or described using a knows that sentence. is in itself does not show RNV to be false. What 
I will call the epistemological dilemma means that intellectualism is either false or not a basis  
for rejecting the Rylean theory. 
In order for the dilemma to be a live problem, what is needed are cases where someone can be  
said to know how to do something, but where they cannot be said to know the proposition of  
the particular form as speciﬁed in LA2, i.e. w  is a way of Φ-ing. Yuri Cath (forthcoming ) 
provides three ways to derive such counter-examples, all of which are familiar from the  
epistemological literature, which are meant to reﬂect facts about our ordinary conception of  
propositional knowledge: Gettier cases, when someone has a belief that is both justiﬁed and 
true, but through an unreliable process; defeating beliefs, where someone derives a true belief 
from a process they believe to be unreliable, and lack of belief, where someone lacks a relevant 
belief. So long as one of these ways of deriving counter-examples is successful, the  
epistemological dilemma can get going. Gettier-type counter-examples have been a primary  
source of counter-examples to proposed analyses of propositional knowledge, and therefore  
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have a good title to genuinely reﬂecting features of that concept, and so I propose only to look  
at counter-examples derived from unreliably justiﬁed true belief.
ese counter-examples make the strong assertion of reductionism problematic because they  
involve cases where someone knows how to do something, but does not know the relevant  
proposition. Cath (op. cit.: 2-3) gives the following example as an instance of a Gettier-type  
counter-example: Someone reads a book which tells them how to change a light bulb;  
consequently they know how to change a lightbulb; but for arcane reasons, the book only  
accidentally contained the right information, i.e. that w is a way of changing a light bulb; so 
they do not know that w is a way of changing a light-bulb. is is therefore one of what Cath 
calls 'NKT' cases, since the subject lacks the relevant knowledge-that, but it is also one of what  
Cath calls 'KH' cases, since the subject does have some bit of knowledge-how. Since  
reductionism implies that all KH are cases where the subject also has the relevant knowledge-
that, the fact that the light-bulb changing case is one of the NKT cases is a counter-example to  
reductionism. Cath usefully distinguishes the objection based on Gettier-type counter-
examples from a diﬀerent objection, which argues that since knowledge-that claims are  
susceptible to Gettier-type counter-examples, and since knowing-how claims are not  
susceptible to Gettier-type counter-examples, the two states are disanalogous. As Cath points  
out (op. cit.: 6-7), whether or not the disanalogy objection is correct makes no di ﬀerence to 
the idea that Gettier-type counter-examples show that there are KH cases which are also NKT  
cases.
One way to avoid this objection is to argue that cases of knowing that which are also cases of  
knowing how are not susceptible to Gettier-style counter-examples. But this cannot, taken  
strictly, be compatible with the reductionist claim, since take one way, it implies that knowing  
that does not reduce to knowing how. e claim would have to be that knowing the special  
propositions that come out of the syntactic analysis in LA2 are not susceptible to Gettier-type  
counter-examples. If this is the claim, then there is no obvious support (op. cit.: 8). An  
alternative would be to appeal to the notion of a practical mode of presentation. is idea is 
supposed to pick out the particular way in which people who know how to do things stand in  
the knowledge relation to the special propositions on the reductionist account (cf. Stanley &  
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Williamson, op. cit.: 429). Stanley and Williamson decline to deﬁne what exactly this is,  
instead appealing to the fact that other modes of presentation, such as the demonstrative or  
ﬁrst-personal, are admitted into respectable theories of propositional attitude ascriptions, so  
practical modes of presentation should be admitted also. 
ere are serious questions about the validity of this move and the nature of the modes of  
presentation in question. But even if they are admitted, practical modes of presentation are  
unsuited for disputing the Gettier-type counter-examples. e counter-examples do not 
purport to show that one does not know the proposition under some other mode of  
presentation; there is only mode of presentation in question, the practical, so one cannot say  
that while one does not know under some other mode of presentation, one does under the  
practical mode of presentation. Unless the argument is that standing in the knowledge relation  
to propositions under practical modes of presentation is immune to Gettier-type counter-
examples, then the appeal to them cannot work. And if the argument is that the knowledge 
relation to propositions is immune in that way, then, then this requires a modi ﬁcation of our 
ordinary understanding of propositional knowledge. is is a step unwarranted by Stanley and 
Williamson's argument, and hence makes the appeal to practical modes of presentation fatally  
ad hoc. 
Cath acknowledges that “even if these arguments succeed it might still be reasonable to hold  
that knowing how to φ is a matter of standing in an intentional relation to a proposition other  
than the knowledge-that relation.” (Cath, op. cit.: 17) is is undoubtedly correct. It also  
relates to the point I have been stressing throughout, that one opposed to the Rylean theory  
need not commit to strong claim that knowing how is a form of propositional knowledge.  
ere is, however, a limit to how concessive one needs to be here, at least in the context of  
objections from linguistic considerations. Intellectualism need not involve propositional  
knowledge, that much is clear. But what is not clear is whether a linguistic argument can be 
given in favour of one of these other, non-knowledge involving intellectualist positions. ere 
is a broader conclusion that can be drawn from the speci ﬁc problem with Stanley and 
Williamson's linguistic argument. It is extremely hard to see how any theory of the structure of  
knows how sentences could demonstrate that some other kind of propositional mental state  
62
Ryle on Knowing How
ﬁgures in their proper semantic interpretation. If this is right, then given that a semantic  
interpretation that involves propositional knowledge is subject to the epistemological  
dilemma, then the only form of intellectualism suﬃcient for refuting the Rylean theory that  
linguistic considerations could possibly establish is false. Although there are no prior  
methodological reasons for excluding linguistic considerations, it turns out that they are not  
enough to refute the Rylean theory.
2.4 Bengson and Moﬀett's Understanding Objection
What I will call Bengson and Moﬀett's (2007) understanding objection starts with reﬂecting on 
the following puzzle: why do some knowing how ascriptions entail the possession of an ability,  
while others do not? Note that the presupposition of this question, the variable entailments of  
knowing how ascriptions, presents a diﬃculty for the neo-Rylean in a way it does not for the  
Rylean theory. On the interpretation being defended here, the Rylean theory only needs the  
weak analysis of knowing how ascriptions, and so is consistent with variable entailments,  
whereas statements of the neo-Rylean theory typically commit to the stronger and hence  
inconsistent analysis. I propose not to say anything about the presupposition, although it is  
worth ﬂagging up the challenge it presents for the neo-Rylean. In the context of competing  
interpretations of Ryle, it would seem to give support to that which is being defended here  
over the stronger neo-Rylean interpretation. 
eir solution to the variable entailments question can be summarised as follows. It starts with  
the thought that knowing how to do something requires having what they term a minimal  
understanding of that activity. Minimal understanding not explicitly deﬁned (this will be 
important later), but Bengson and Moﬀett make clear it requires “a reasonable mastery of  
certain concepts” (op. cit.: 42). One understands an activity if, and only if, one has a reasonable  
mastery of the concept of the activity in question. Taking the example of addition, if someone  
“does not have a suﬃciently solid grasp of the concept plus, then she cannot be said to 
understand addition, and vice versa.” (ibid.) Conceptual mastery must be reasonable, because it 
need not be complete. At the same time, it is not the same as merely possessing a concept. One 
could possess the concept of plus, by being able, for instance, to memorise statements about  
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the additive relations between numbers, but lack reasonable mastery since, for instance, one  
cannot generate new statements of that kind. A reasonable mastery is compatible with “fairly  
substantial misunderstanding or ignorance with regard to complex applications,” (ibid.) but  
must go beyond mere possession. e last step in their explanation is to appeal to intuitions  
about reasonable mastery. For some activities, the activities for which knows how ascriptions  
entail ability possession, a reasonable mastery of concepts cannot obtain in the absence of the  
possession of that ability. Such concepts are termed “ability-based concepts.” (op. cit.: 43). And  
thus the explanation of variable entailments.
According to Bengson and Moﬀett, with this explanation is in place an argument against the  
Rylean theory can be given. e argument begins with the observation that misunderstandings  
can undermine knowing how. To demonstrate this, the example of Irina the neurologically  
abnormal ice-skater, whom we encountered earlier in the discussion of abilities, is brought in.  
Recall the details of that case were that an ice skater is reliably successful at pulling oﬀ a triple 
salchow, but only due to a neurological abnormality that, were it not present, would mean she  
would fail to do the jump correct. e point there was to illustrate diﬀerent ways in which 
ability terms can be used. Bengson and Moﬀett add a crucial detail, which is that Irina believes  
something about how to do the triple salchow. A triple salchow requires jumping oﬀ the back 
of the skate, spinning three times in the air, and landing on the front of the skate. Irina believes  
it requires jumping oﬀ the front of the skate, spinning three times in the air, and landing on  
the back of the skate. e neurological abnormality comes in because every time Irina attempts 
to the triple salchow, she does the right thing despite having the wrong belief as a consequence  
of her peculiar wiring. What this shows, on Bengson and Moﬀett's view, is that knowing how 
to do something is not merely equivalent to having an ability, but depends also on having a  
minimal understanding of the activity in question. is is what Irina lacks. So if she cannot be  
ascribed knowing how, the explanation of this is that she has the wrong minimal  
understanding, or perhaps, that she has no minimal understanding at all. 
It is worth reﬂecting on this proposal before moving on. One thing that needs to be pointed  
out right away is that the Rylean theory does not have the consequence that Irina does in fact  
know how to do the triple salchow because she is able to do it. Bengson and Mo ﬀett's 
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understanding of what having an ability in the relevant sense requires is anything but  
compulsory, and, I would suggest, is false. As they would have it, Irina is able to do a triple  
salchow because is reliably successful. If having an ability is suﬃcient for knowing how, then 
surely the Rylean theory predicts that she knows how. But this is controversial, and so it would  
seem the Rylean theory is controversial too. e problem with this as an objection is fairly 
clear. Going back to the discussion above, the Rylean view need not be that having an ability is  
being reliably successful. Reliable success is not enough. It must be the case that the success is  
something that can be attributed to the agent herself. In the terminology adopted above, the  
success must be reliable and creditable. In the ice skater case, her success is not creditable to her  
in the necessary way; the presence of the neurological abnormality makes her success lucky. So  
the objection rests on treating the notion that knowing how is connected with the possession  
of an ability with a lack of proper subtlety. Far from getting the wrong result in Irina's case, the  
Rylean theory has a ready explanation for why she does not know how – she lacks the ability.  
Failure to see this lies in a faulty understanding of what an ability is in the relevant sense, a  
failure that cannot be alleged against Ryle (mainly because it is something le only implicit in 
his discussion of knowing how). e fault lies in the understanding of what abilities are, not in  
the theory that appeals to such things. 
e objection to the Rylean theory that actually comes out of Bengson and Mo ﬀett's 
discussion is not primarily to do with providing counterexamples to the suﬃciency or 
otherwise of abilities for knowing how (although they intimate that this is how they see things,  
but no matter). e ice-skater case is meant to make room for the idea that minimal  
understanding is a condition on knowing how, and accepting the proposal, which I shall refer  
to as the understanding claim, apparently precipitates an account of knowing how that presents  
two potential problems. ese problems give the substance of the understanding objection.  
e ﬁrst problem is that the understanding proposal posits something over and above the  
dispositional state mentioned by the positive view, RPV, which is claimed is necessary and  
suﬃcient. If understanding is a further psychological fact about the individual that knows how,  
albeit one necessary for the latter condition, then the dispositional state is not suﬃcient. But 
this problem does not even arise if the second problem is genuine. If minimal understanding  
requires being in mental states with propositional content, then the understanding proposal  
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implies that the negative view, RNV, is incorrect, in which case RPV needs to be thrown out  
along with it.
at Bengson and Moﬀett think that this requirement goes through is clear enough. On their  
account, the understanding proposal chimes with Stanley and Williamson's proposed  
semantics for knows how ascriptions discussed above. As they have it, “[t]hese considerations  
[i.e. the understanding claim] take us naturally to something like Stanley and Williamson's 
analysis of know how.” (47; emphasis added) eir account of said analysis leaves something to 
be desired, but regardless, Bengson and Moﬀett reject it as not making room for the role of  
understanding. Nevertheless, something of the Stanley and Williamson's account remains in  
their account, which is this:
(Bengson and Moﬀett) S knows how to Φ if, and only if, for some way w of Φ-ing: (a) 
S knows w, and (b) S knows that w is a way of Φ-ing (op. cit.: 47)
Given the introduction of propositional knowledge, Bengson and Moﬀett's account can be 
rightly called intellectualist along with Stanley and Williamson's, although it is a weaker form,  
since it does not reduce knowing how to a species of knowing that. It should by now go  
without saying that the mention of propositional knowledge is both mistaken, given the  
possibility of Cath style counter-examples, and otiose. However, due to the relative weakness  
of their intellectualism, it can be dispensed with in a way that Stanley and Williamson's  
linguistic argument means it cannot on their view. e problem that their proposal presents  
for RNV lies not with the knowledge part of propositional knowledge, but the propositional 
part. 
2.5 Response to the Understanding Objection
Bengson and Moﬀett say the understanding claim naturally suggests an intellectualist analysis.  
But the question that needs to be asked is: where exactly do mental states with propositional  
content come into the picture? Of course, if introducing propositional knowledge was  
unproblematic, then the obvious answer would go via that; if understanding requires  
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propositional knowledge, then understanding requires being in a propositional mental state.  
But since it is not unproblematic, we need to ask the more basic question. Nevertheless, the  
main diﬃculty with the move from the understanding claim to the necessity of propositional  
mental states can be put in their terms. Quite simply, it is entirely unclear why propositional  
knowledge should be a necessary condition of understanding. is move is le unsupported. 
And if the claim is weakened to the idea that propositional mental states are a necessary  
condition of understanding, then an identical problem arises. It is le  entirely unexplained 
why understanding requires being in a mental state with propositional content. 
ere are two candidates for what, on their view, introduces the element of propositionality.  
One is the acquaintance condition on understanding , and the other is the notion of  
understanding itself. ere are problems here. Firstly, it is unclear why knowledge by  
acquaintance of a way of Φ-ing should be needed in addition to knowledge that, knowledge or 
by description. And certainly, knowledge by acquaintance of something abstract is not  
something that can be le unexamined in the way that, say, knowledge by acquaintance of a  
person or mid-sized concrete objects can. In that spirit, it could be pressed that either  
knowledge by acquaintance makes propositional knowledge redundant, because it implies  
propositional knowledge anyway, or it does not, but does not introduce propositionality  
either. So knowledge by acquaintance cannot be what does it.
e real question, however, is why knowledge of either type should come in at all. Is it possible  
that Bengson and Moﬀett take it to have been already established that knowing how involves  
propositional knowledge, and it is acquaintance, knowing a way of Φ-ing, that acts as a gloss  
on the idea that understanding is a condition of knowing how? I do not think so, since this  
leaves entirely unexplained why the understanding claim should take us naturally to something  
like Stanley and Williamson's analysis, rather than being something that needs to be added on  
to it. Whatever the thought process, the reply is that there is no reason for thinking  
understanding necessarily involves propositional mental states. It is equally possible to argue  
that, if understanding and/or knowledge by acquaintance is a necessary condition on knowing  
how, and since knowing how does not necessarily require propositional mental states, then the  
same must go for them. Nothing Bengson and Moﬀett give us rules out this turning of  
67
Ryle on Knowing How
inferential tables.
A possible response to this is that the Irina case shows that understanding necessitates  
propositional mental states, so that the worries about how propositionality could be  
introduced via abstract reﬂections on understanding or acquaintance are by the bye. Irina has a  
mistaken belief, and that is what explains why she does not know how to do a triple salchow .  
But we have already seen that Irina lacks the ability, in the relevant sense, and so on the Rylean  
view it is this that explains the lack of knowing how. In order for the example to be one that  
really (i.e. non-question beggingly) causes a diﬃculty for the Rylean theory, one would need to  
change the case to one where someone does not know how, but does have the ability, and  
where the lack of know how is to be explained by the presence of a correct belief. So the case is  
one of a diﬀerent ice skater, Maria say, has a mistaken belief (perhaps she and Irina went to the  
same disreputable ice-skating school), and also like Irina can do the triple salchow just right,  
but in contrast to Irina, stipulate that she does so in such a way that she is creditable with the  
success.
ere are two diﬃculties with appealing to a Maria-style case as a way of substantiating the  
propositionality of understanding. One is that it is unclear why Maria's mistaken belief should  
be psychologically relevant given that it does not aﬀect her performance in any way. Cases  
where an agent has a mistaken belief but also has the ability do not show that knowing how  
requires propositional mental states, but rather suggest the opposite. At least, a further case  
would be needed to show that it is relevant. e other problem is that the example may not be 
one that supports Bengson and Moﬀett's case. To do so, it must be the case that Maria does not  
know how to do a triple salchow. Judgements on whether she does or not may vary. I would  
submit that Maria may be one case where judgements are not so reliable as to be free from  
revision, not least because it is diﬃcult to interpret, and so it is better to place it in a wider  
context of other cases, ones where clear judgements are easy enough to come by. On that basis,  
one can provide a theory to explain these relatively clear judgements, and then apply the  
theory to Maria's case. e Rylean theory, which we can suppose does well with the central  
cases, predicts that Maria does indeed know how. is would then make both the belief 
denying and belief irrelevance interpretations of the case, on which the supposition of  
68
Ryle on Knowing How
mistaken belief can be sidelined, look highly plausible. So the Irina case is plainly not a  
counter-example to the Rylean theory, and Maria-style variations on the Irina case do not issue  
in suﬃciently theoretically insulated judgements.
Bengson and Moﬀett say nothing to get us from understanding to propositional mental states.  
is point is merely ad hominem, so perhaps we should look elsewhere for a reason to accept  
their move from the understanding claim to an intellectualist analysis of knowing how. A  
theory which might do is to be found presented forcefully in Jerry Fodor's e Language of  
ought (1975). On this theor y,  in order to learn a concept, an entity su ﬃciently 
psychologically similar to ourselves must go through a process of hypothesis formation and  
conﬁrmation (cf. op. cit.: 36). Hypotheses are propositional, and hypothesising is a  
propositional mental state; one hypothesises that such and such is the case. So if learning  
necessarily involves hypothesis formation and conﬁrmation, it follows that learning requires  
propositional mental states. e implication of this view, which combines a representational  
and with a computational theory of mind, is oen known as the language of thought hypothesis, 
or simply neo-cognitivism (I take the term from Dennett, 1978: ch. 9). Some have sought to  
criticise intellectualist views on knowing how by associating them with neo-cognitivism (this  
seems to be one theme in Noë, 2005), although the extent to which this is fair is up for debate.  
Interestingly, others have sought to establish something like the Rylean theory by appealing to  
results from empirical psychology that would run counter to the evidence to which the neo-
cognitivist appeals (see, e.g., Wallis, 2008; Glick, forthcoming, discusses such arguments). 
Does neo-cognitivism help Bengson and Moﬀett? One might argue that learning cannot be  
hypothesis formation and conﬁrmation because of the following reductio ad absurdum 
argument: if the ability to entertain propositional thoughts requires learning, then in the  
process of learning how to entertain propositional thoughts, one would need to do what one  
was learning to do before having learned to do it; that is plainly impossible, so the idea that  
learning is hypothesis conﬁrmation and formation engenders absurdity. e Fodorian response 
is to embrace nativism, i.e. reject the idea that the ability to entertain propositional thoughts  
requires learning; concepts put one in a position to think propositional thoughts, and so if  
learning must be understood as hypothesis formation and con ﬁrmation, and hypothesis  
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formation and conﬁrmation requires propositional thought, then concepts are not learned,  
and so must be innate (cf. Fodor, 1975: 65). And this is ultimately the reason why neo-
cognitivism fails to do the job. If neo-cognitivism is correct, and there is no concept learning,  
then a fortiori it is not the case that concepts are learned through a process of hypothesis  
formation and conﬁrmation. e necessary propositionality of learning would therefore not,  
even on the assumption that understanding is equivalent to reasonable conceptual mastery,  
entail propositionality of understanding. Alternatively if there is concept learning, then it is  
not through a process of hypothesis formation and conﬁrmation, since this would mean the 
reductio argument succeeds, and neo-cognitivism is false. So appeal to neo-cogntivism (or any  
view on which one learns concepts via a process that involves propositional thought) does not  
help on this point.
So much for the second problem. e question posed by the ﬁrst problem was whether the  
understanding claim means there is some extra psychological fact about individuals that know  
how to do things that goes beyond the dispositional state put forward by RPV. If one accepts  
the Rylean theory, then there is no reason to think that understanding of this kind is  
something over and above the dispositional state put forward by RPV. Understanding may  
rather be something that  depends on or is constituted by that state. What the understanding  
proposal might be making explicit is the fact that knows how ascriptions involve a  
commitment to attributing understanding; this is useful, it would seem, for approaching a  
puzzle about the semantics of knows how sentences. Seeing whether this ﬁrst problem is 
genuine requires getting clear on the relationship between the state of understanding and the  
state of knowing how; does the latter depend on the former, or the other way around? e 
understanding claim is neutral on this question. It is consistent with either possibility, and  
hence how it is to be understood in the last analysis can be made dependent on our theory of  
knowing how, rather than the other way around.
Answering the question of what depends on what cannot be done without also saying  
something about what, exactly, one means by understanding. Or at last this is true if one wants  
to argue from understanding to a certain analysis of knowing how, as Bengson and Mo ﬀett 
seem to want. And the main diﬃculty in their discussion on this point, as I hope has been  
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made clear, is that relatively little is said about this. What they do say, however, is that one  
understands an activity if, and only if, one has reasonable mastery of the relevant concepts, and  
for certain activities, this requires having the relevant ability. On an interpretation of the  
understanding claim that is sympathetic to RPV, understanding an activity is something that  
consists in, or may consist in, being disposed to act in the right sort of way, such that one can  
be said to have the ability, and hence know how, to engage in that activity. Both interpretations  
can accept that understanding in some cases requires the relevant ability. e diﬀerence 
between the two comes down to whether abilities, in the correct sense, are suﬃcient for 
understanding, or not. If abilities are suﬃcient for understanding, then the latter can be seen as  
a constituted, as opposed to a constituting, feature of an ability, in the sense that it is  
constituted by what constitutes an ability, rather than being something that is independent of  
and constitutive of an ability. e proposal, on the weakest construal, is that a theory of  
knowing how as basic, theoretically speaking, than a theory of understanding, or more so. To  
give it a name, let's call this the priority claim. 
If the priority claim is right, then we do not need to hold oﬀ giving a theory of knowing how 
before giving a theory of understanding, and so the latter can be constrained by the former.  
And if that's right, then the move from understanding to propositionality is put in jeopardy  
precisely by the Rylean theory, rather than the other way around. I will say something in the  
next section in support of this claim. To return to Fodor, it was argued just now that his neo-
cognitivism cannot come to the a id of  a Bengson and Mo ﬀett style argument for  
intellectualism. In his Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong, Fodor defends the view 
that “concepts are constituents of mental states.”(1998: 6) Mental states, on the  
representational theory of mind to which Fodor subscribes, are “species of relations to mental  
representations” (ibid.) which take propositional form. So it could be that, if understanding is  
equivalent to reasonable conceptual mastery, then since concepts are constituents of  
propositionally structured mental representations, a story can be told on which understanding  
is necessarily either itself propositional or something that requires propositional mental states.  
One might see this view of concepts to be serially problematic for the Rylean theory, not least  
because it seems to be in tension with a view on which concepts are susceptible to dispositional  
reduction (cf. Fodor, op. cit.: 4-5), which is what the Rylean interpretation of the  
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understanding claim requires. But if the no priority claim is plausible, then there are grounds  
for thinking that, rather than presenting a wealth of reasons for rejecting the Rylean theory of  
knowing how, the Rylean theory of knowing how can play a role in addressing whether the  
Fodorian view of concepts is correct. 
A few comments are in order. e ﬁrst is that the priority claim is merely a proposal. I will  
provide reasons for accepting it in the next section. e second is that raising the priority claim 
in this context is a product of accepting the understanding claim in the ﬁrst place, and I have  
not meant to endorse it as it stands. A third is that Bengson and Mo ﬀett must, given their 
other commitments, reject the Rylean interpretation of the understanding claim. As we have  
seen, they appear to think that understanding always involves some sort of propositional  
mental state or states, and sometimes involves an ability also. But without a demonstration of  
the necessary propositionality of understanding, the alternative interpretation is le   open. 
ey would also reject the idea that knowing how may consist in an ability, and so even if  
understanding depended on knowing how, they would reject the implication that  
understanding may consist in an ability. We have already seen that their motivation for doing  
so is motivated by a faulty take on what abilities are in the relevant sense. If we do grant the  
correctness of the Rylean theory as well as the cogency of the understanding claim, then it  
seems understanding is not, therefore, something over and above the dispositional state. So if  
the understanding claim is a good way of dealing with the variable entailments thesis, which it  
may well be, then it can be combined with the Rylean theory without diﬃculty, and neither 
part of the understanding objection presents a live problem.
2.6 Dummett on Representing Abilities As Knowledge
Michael Dummett (1993: 94-116) has argued that knowledge is central to our understanding  
of language, and has used this to derive results, negative and positive, about the nature of a  
philosophical theory of meaning. Very roughly, his argument is that semantic theory, the  
theory of meaning, should be such as to yield a theory of understanding. Since understanding  
is manifested in linguistic capacities, the ability to use a language and respond appropriately to  
others' verbal communicative acts, theories of features of language such as reference and sense  
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should be constrained by facts about those capacities. Knowledge comes into this because, as  
Dummett rightly points out, linguistic capacities can be represented using knowledge  
ascriptions. For instance, we talk of someone knowing a language, or knowing what some  
expression means. We also talk of people knowing how to speak a language. is prompts 
Dummett to ask whether knowledge in this sense is a mere way of talking, or if the idea that it  
is really knowledge that is the relevant mental state can be vindicated. Dummett's view is the  
latter. In the process of providing the vindication, he makes a number of remarks that seem to  
conﬂict with the Rylean theory. 
 
Unlike Stanley and Williamson, Dummett does not claim that knowing how just is 
propositional knowledge. And unlike Bengson and Moﬀett, he is not claiming that knowing  
how always requires propositional knowledge. Dummett's thought is rather that there are two  
senses of knowing how, or two ways in which we use knows how sentences, one of which is  
appropriate to activities like swimming , while the other is appropriate to activities like  
speaking a language: “Knowing Spanish, or knowing how to speak Spanish, is not, aer all, to 
be compared with knowing how to swim.” (op. cit.: 95)  Dummett proposes that ascriptions of 
knowledge how are not genuinely ascriptions of knowledge unless the activity in question is  
such that having the ability to engage in that activity requires propositional knowledge. To  
illustrate this, he uses the idea of a scale of “degrees of consciousness with which a person may  
perform a skilled operation.” (ibid.) 
By 'degrees of consciousness', Dummett means explicit or implicit knowledge of how it is one  
carries out a skilled operation. Sometimes, one requires appeal to explicit knowledge in order  
to be able to carry out some operation, in a way similar to that envisioned by the intellectualist  
legend; in other cases, one may implicitly know, and so be able to say what it is one is doing  
and how one is doing it if asked, although one does not need to refer to explicit statements in  
the actual carrying out of the operation; and in others, one may be entirely unable to do even  
that, yet still be able to carry out the operation. As opposed to cases of this last sort, where “the  
expression 'knows how to do it' has only the force of 'can do it as the result of learning to do it,'  
(op. cit.: 96; emphasis added) the cases of the intermediate kind (and presumably cases of the  
ﬁrst kind too) are ones where “we have to take more seriously the ascription of knowledge to  
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someone who possesses the practical ability in question.” (ibid.)
So Dummett is suggesting that there are diﬀering senses of knowing how appropriate to  
gradations along this scale. One sense is a “mere idiomatic equivalent of 'can do it',” (ibid.)  
while the other is one in which the verb 'to know' is used to attribute implicit propositional  
knowledge in addition to an ability: “we may say of the agent that he knows that certain things 
are the case... [is knowledge] shows itself partly by manifestation of the practical ability, and  
partly by readiness to acknowledge as correct a formulation of that which is known when it is  
presented.” (ibid.) e problem this presents for the Rylean theory is that, if there are these  
two idiomatic and non-idiomatic senses of knowing how, then the weak analysis and RNV  
cannot both be correct. e weak analysis is false if RNV is correct, because it shows that  
someone's possessing an ability is not always suﬃcient for the relevant knows how sentence to 
be true. RNV is false is the weak analysis is correct, because sometimes knowing how does  
require propositional knowledge. is arises because of the apparent diﬀerences between ways 
in which we represent abilities using the verb 'to know'. Since Dummett says that knows how  
sentences can be used to indicate an ability, he would accept the weak analysis. So his remarks  
suggest that RNV is false, and is a kind of intellectualist objection. To give it a label, call this  
the representation problem.
It would be wrong to avoid the representation problem by arguing that the Rylean is only  
interested in the sense of knowing how that is appropriate to swimming, and not the sense of  
knowing how appropriate to speaking a language. e Rylean theory is, I have argued, at base a  
theory of abilities, and this ought to include linguistic abilities. Such a retreat in response to  
the representation problem would therefore mean moving away not just from the letter but  
also from the spirit of the enterprise. It would also be unnecessary. A better option is to take a  
closer look at the details of what Dummett says. Although he is no doubt right about some  
things, he is wrong or unclear about some others, and it is worth seeing how the Rylean theory  
can be made to ﬁt in with what is right, even if it cannot be made to ﬁt with the remarks taken 
on their own terms. I want to argue that the Rylean theory is consistent with there being a  
diﬀerence between linguistic abilities and others, even when this di ﬀerence brings in 
propositional knowledge. e burden of argument is to show that Dummett has no grounds  
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for saying that there are two senses of knowing how in the way he thinks.
To see how to avoid the representation problem, I want to return to the issues discussed in  
section 2.5. Recall the two problems that the Bengson and Moﬀett argument raised. Both turn  
on the introduction of extra concepts in our account of what it takes to possess an ability of  
the relevant kind. We can call them extra concept problems. e ﬁrst extra concept problem 
was that, once we take a closer look at cases where knowing how is or is not present, then it  
turns out we need to bring some extra conceptual apparatus into our account of abilities that  
means RPV is inadequate. e second extra concept problem was that the nature of this  
apparatus is such that propositional mental states are required for abilities, and this means  
RNV is false. is is what provides the distinctively intellectualist ﬂavour to the objection. 
Recall also the two reasons for rejecting these as genuine problems. Against the ﬁrst problem, 
the reply was that the extra concept can be seen as picking out a dependent feature of knowing  
how. Against the second problem, the reply was that there is no reason to think the extra  
element in fact introduces propositional mental states. e two problems are of course related, 
in the sense that the second stands or falls with the ﬁrst. If there is no extra concept to be  
introduced, then by implication the concept of propositional mental states does not need to be  
introduced. Both problems concern the structure of the constitutive conditions for abilities in  
the relevant sense. Placing the problems for Bengson and Moﬀett's particular argument in 
more general terms will help to get clearer on what that structure is, and this will show how the  
Rylean can properly address the representation problem.
e claim that propositional knowledge or any other propositional mental state is necessary  
for possessing an ability falls foul of the fact that a theory of what it takes to possess an ability  
must,  in order not to introduce redundancies,  be psychologically thin.  A  th e o r y  i s 
psychologically thin if it introduces few or relatively few psychological concepts in the  
constitutive conditions it proposes. Psychological thinness is a useful way of approaching these  
problems in a couple of ways. One is that explaining why giving an account of abilities, i.e.  
reliable and creditable success in an intelligent activity, is psychologically thin can be done by  
reﬂecting on the what I will refer to as the structure of their constitutive conditions, the way in 
which the conditions necessary and suﬃcient for their possession can be categorised. Like  
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functional states, abilities are multiply realisable, in the sense that there are few (if any)  
restrictions on what sorts of thing can be in them. 
Why accept this? Going back to the analogy with functional states, abilities are deﬁned purely 
by their input and output conditions, not by what we can call structural conditions, which are 
restrictions on what kind of structure can meet the input and output conditions. In the case of  
abilities, the output conditions are reliable success in carrying out an intention; the input  
conditions are acquisition of the dispositional state in such a way that the reliable success can  
be credited to the agent, i.e. by learning the rules. e input and output conditions set out  
what it is that constitutes possessing the ability, or being in the functional state. Both  
functional states and abilities, in this way, share the same structure of constitutive conditions.  
e analogy only goes so far; functional states are not necessarily dispositions, but are rather  
ways of relating actual causal inputs with actual causal outputs, and involve dispositional or  
categorical properties. But the similarities in the structure of constitutive conditions between  
abilities and functional states go some way to getting at the criteria for a the theory of a state  
being psychologically thin.
With the structure of the constitutive conditions of abilities in hand, we can say why the extra  
concept problems do not present genuine objections. e no priority claim that ﬁgured in the 
reply to the second extra concept problem was the thought that the best theory of knowing  
how does not need to be determined by the best theory of other psychological concepts. If the  
theory of knowing how is psychologically thin, then it brings in few commitments about those  
other concepts, and provides is a good place to begin inquiry. e priority claim is, it bears  
saying, an idea about how to think about these concepts, rather than a thought about the  
relationships between the assorted phenomena about which the concepts enable us to think. It  
is oen sensible to start by thinking about the epistemically basic objects of inquiry ﬁrst, and 
the suggestion here is that abilities are candidates for being epistemically basic because  
psychologically thin. e ﬁrst extra concept problem, the idea that further analysis will show  
an extra concept needs to be brought into account for the nature of abilities, falls foul of the  
psychological thinness of abilities because of redundancy. If the analogy between abilities and  
functional states is accurate, and abilities are deﬁned in terms of input and output conditions,  
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then the dispositional state and the conditions on the acquisition of those dispositions do all  
the work needed. So any extra concept will either need to be open to reinterpretation as a  
picking out what I have called a grounded feature of abilities, or else it is dispensable because  
redundant.
Let me emphasise that none of the above goes to show that propositional mental states do not  
feature at all in an account of knowing how. It may be that for some activities, they are a  
necessary condition. is is the upshot of Dummett's remarks. e weak analysis leaves open 
the possibility that knows how ascriptions can be made true by the possession of information  
rather than the possession of an ability. As discussed in the previous section, this presents  
puzzles of its own, regarding the correct semantics of knows how sentences. But it is hard to  
see how the Rylean theory is in danger from potential answers to these puzzles. Very weak  
intellectualist accounts of knowing how are not ruled out by the Rylean theory. What is ruled  
out are forms of intellectualism which make it a necessary condition, even when grounded by  
an ability, either in the form of Stanley and Williamson-style reduction or Bengson and  
Moﬀett-style supplementation.
e reason Dummett's remarks do not present a problem for the Rylean theory can now be set  
out. e propositional knowledge that is required for linguistic ability is not exclusive of but  
rather part of the grounds for the ability. One would have grounds for positing two di ﬀerent 
senses of knowing how, Dummett's idiomatic and non-idiomatic senses, if one assumed that  
propositional knowledge and abilities do not enter into this sort of grounding relation.  
Propositional knowledge, on that assumption, would be exclusive of abilities; they would not 
coincide in the way I have described. But there is no reason to accept this, and the proposal  
that abilities share a structure of constitutive conditions with functional states gives a reason to  
reject it. Propositional knowledge may be a condition on having an ability to do a certain  
activity in that it is part of what it is to have that ability. Whether or not this is so falls outside  
of the purview of this essay.
If we do not need to multiply senses of knowing how, then what is the right thing to say about  
this situation? A simple answer is to distinguish kinds of abilities, while combining this with  
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the idea that these kinds of abilities do not have diﬀerent constitutive conditions qua abilities. 
ere is a diﬀerence between constitutive conditions on being an X as such, and constitutive  
conditions on being an X of some more determinate kind rather than another. Say there are  
two ways of being an X, being an X1 and being an X2. What distinguishes these as ways of  
being an X are that the constitutive conditions for being an X 1 and being an X2 are diﬀerent. 
is means there are diﬀerent constitutive conditions for being an X. But it does not follow  
that there are diﬀerent conditions for being an X as such. When talking at the highest level of  
abstraction about knowing how, as the Rylean theory does, the claims are about knowing how  
as such. So the weak analysis can be preserved. Perhaps this is false for some values of X 1 and 
X2; it is possibly false of what Wittgenstein called family resemblance concepts. I have argued  
that knowing how is not one of these. Dummett may therefore be right that linguistic ability  
requires propositional knowledge. But there are no grounds for distinguishing senses of  
knowing how along these lines, and so the Rylean theory can be preserved.
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3. Conclusion 
is essay began with some remarks about the importance of Ryle's discussion for the debate  
over the nature of knowing how. One potentially surprising feature of the account of the  
Rylean theory oﬀered in the ﬁrst half of the essay is that knowing how is in fact dispensable as  
a way of thinking about what Ryle was talking about. More precisely, he was concerned with  
intelligent activity and the abilities, in a particular sense of that term, we have with respect to  
it. One could state the theory without introducing the concept of knowledge at all. Failure to  
recognise this fact is indicative of and can also lead to certain mistakes in interpretation, and  
subsequently in critical strategies. However, it does not change the fact that Ryle's discussion is  
an important contribution to understanding knowing how. If the argument in the second half  
of the essay is correct, then at least the negative view is correct, and so the positive view cannot  
be rejected on the basis of intellectualism.
e reason for concentrating on intellectualist objections is clear; since the debate has been  
largely dominated by the thought that either intellectualism or neo-Ryleanism is correct, and  
since the neo-Rylean position is a bad way of interpreting Ryle, then defending Ryle should in  
the ﬁrst instance address intellectualism, by defending the negative view. All this shows is that  
neo-Ryleanism and intellectualism do not exhaust the possibilities. It leaves untouched the  
question of whether the positive view is correct in its details or its consequences. In terms of  
the details, one very important the idea that knowing how is a dispositional state does not  
follow directly from the failure of intellectualism. One might therefore accept the criticisms of  
the arguments for intellectualism given here, while not accepting the positive view as it stands. 
So there is room for debate within a broadly a non-intellectualist approach to knowing how  
over whether an equally adequate or superior theory can be given that relies instead on  
categorical mental states. Doing this would also require further inquiry into the nature of  
dispositional states themselves, and would require also require a deeper look at the proposals  
regarding the structure of the constitutive conditions for abilities given in section  2.6. In terms 
of the consequences, there are the issues alluded to in the introduction; these are the questions  
of how the Rylean theory ramiﬁes for our understanding of philosophically interesting  
activities like language, and of the mind in general. is essay has, for reasons of space and 
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relative urgency, said nothing about either of these issues, but the hope is that the foregoing  
has provided a reasonably solid foundation for addressing both.
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